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Executive summary 
Privacy and data protection constitute core values of individuals and of democratic societies. This has 
been acknowledged by the European Convention on Human Rights1 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights2 that enshrine privacy as a fundamental right. With the progress in the field of infor-
mation and communication technologies, and especially due to the decrease in calculation and stor-
age costs, new challenges to privacy and data protection have emerged. There have been decades of 
debate on how those values—and legal obligations—can be embedded into systems, preferably from 
the very beginning of the design process. 
One important element in this endeavour are technical mechanisms, most prominently so-called Pri-
vacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs), e.g. encryption, protocols for anonymous communications, at-
tribute based credentials and private search of databases. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated 
by researchers and in pilot implementations. However, apart from a few exceptions, e.g., encryption 
became widely used, PETs have not become a standard and widely used component in system design. 
Furthermore, for unfolding their full benefit for privacy and data protection, PETs need to be rooted 
in a data governance strategy to be applied  in  practice.  The  term  “Privacy  by  Design”, or its variation 
“Data  Protection  by  Design”, has been coined as a development method for privacy-friendly systems 
and services, thereby going beyond mere technical solutions and addressing organisational proce-
dures and business models as well. Although the concept has found its way into legislation as the 
proposed European General Data Protection Regulation3, its concrete implementation remains un-
clear at the present moment. 
This report contributes to bridging the gap between the legal framework and the available technolog-
ical implementation measures by providing an inventory of existing approaches, privacy design strat-
egies, and technical building blocks of various degrees of maturity from research and development. 
Starting from the privacy principles of the legislation, important elements are presented as a first step 
towards a design process for privacy-friendly systems and services. The report sketches a method to 
map legal obligations to design strategies, which allow the system designer to select appropriate tech-
niques for implementing the identified privacy requirements. Furthermore, the report reflects limita-
tions of the approach. It distinguishes inherent constraints from those which are induced by the cur-
rent state of the art. It concludes with recommendations on how to overcome and mitigate these 
limits.  
Objectives of the report 
This report shall promote the discussion on how privacy by design can be implemented with the help 
of engineering methods. It provides a basis for better understanding of the current state of the art 
concerning privacy by design with a focus on the technological side. Data protection authorities can 
use the report as a reference of currently available technologies and methods. Lastly, the report 
should help regulators to better understand the opportunities, challenges and limits of the by-design 
principles with respect to privacy and data protection, to improve the expressiveness and effective-
ness of future policy. 
                                                          
1 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF=11/12/2014&CL=ENG 
2 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_en.htm 
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Key findings 
We observed that privacy and data protection features are, on the whole, ignored by traditional engi-
neering approaches when implementing the desired functionality. This ignorance is caused and sup-
ported by limitations of awareness and understanding of developers and data controllers as well as 
lacking tools to realise privacy by design. While the research community is very active and growing, 
and constantly improving existing and contributing further building blocks, it is only loosely interlinked 
with practice. This gap has to be bridged to achieve successful privacy-friendly design of systems and 
services and evolve the present state of the art. Further, enforcement of compliance with the 
regulatory privacy and data protection framework has to become more effective, i.e., better incen-
tives for compliance as well as serious sanctions for non-compliance are needed. Also, privacy-by-
design can very much be promoted by suitable standards that should incorporate privacy and data 
protection features as a general rule. 
List of Recommendations 
This is a mere list of our main recommendations; for deeper explanations see section 5.2. 
x Policy makers need to support the development of new incentive mechanisms for privacy-
friendly services and need to promote them.  
x The research community needs to further investigate in privacy engineering, especially with a 
multidisciplinary approach. This process should be supported by research funding agencies. 
The results of research need to be promoted by policy makers and media.  
x Providers of software development tools and the research community need to offer tools that 
enable the intuitive implementation of privacy properties.  
x Especially in publicly co-founded infrastructure projects, privacy-supporting components, 
such as key servers and anonymising relays, should be included.  
x Data protection authorities should play an important role providing independent guidance 
and assessing modules and tools for privacy engineering.  
x Legislators need to promote privacy and data protection in their norms. 
x Standardisation bodies need to include privacy considerations in the standardisation process.  
x Standards for interoperability of privacy features should be provided by standardization bod-
ies. 
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1 Introduction 
Privacy is a fundamental human right. This is acknowledged by Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights4,  which  provides  a  right  to  respect  for  one’s  “private  and  family  life,  his  home  and  
his  correspondence”.  Similarly,  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  defines  the  
“respect  for  private  and  family  life”  (Article 7)  and  adds  a  specific  article  on  “protection  of  personal  
data”  (Article  8).  Moreover on an even wider scope, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights5 protects   an   individual   from  “arbitrary   interference with his privacy, family, home or corre-
spondence,” and “attacks upon his honour and reputation”.  Privacy protection is not only to be re-
garded as an individual value, but also as an essential element in the functioning of democratic socie-
ties.  
In the digital world, we observe a massive power imbalance between data processing entities, which 
determine what and how data is processed, and the individuals whose data is at stake, i.e., whose 
lives might be influenced by decisions based on automated data analysis, or by failures to adequately 
protect private information. Hence, specifically in the digital world, the protection of privacy plays a 
crucial role. However, when using a specific service, many individuals are often unaware of the data 
processing and its consequences.6 Moreover,   the  user’s  subsequent control over the nature of the 
processing that happens to their personal data once it is given away is limited. Lastly, penalties for 
infringements of legal data protection obligations usually take effect only after the fact, i.e. if a breach 
or misuse of data has occurred already. 
At the same time, our society more and more depends on the trustworthy functioning of information 
and communication technologies (ICT). Processing capabilities—storage, CPUs, networking—have in-
creased, processing of personal data has intensified. Current trends comprise minimisation of pro-
cessing power of sensors, detachment of guaranteed locations in cloud computing, mobile  and  “al-­‐
ways  on”  usage,  big  data  analytics for all conceivable purposes. In essence, almost all areas of life are 
connected with ICT support, and hence would be affected if trustworthiness cannot be maintained. 
On the down side of this development are unclear responsibilities and lack of transparency for users 
and regulatory bodies, and largely missing guarantees of privacy and security features. In practice, 
European Data Protection Authorities lack the capacity to effectively and systematically monitor data 
processing or penalise premeditated or negligent wrongdoing. 
Having said that, digital technologies may be designed to protect privacy. Since the 1980s technologies 
with embedded privacy features have been proposed [57].  The  term  “privacy-enhancing technologies 
(PETs)”  was introduced for a category of technologies that minimise the processing of personal data 
[119, 39]. By using PETs, the risks  for  the  users’  informational  privacy would decrease and the legal 
data protection obligations of the entities responsible for the data processing would be fulfilled more 
easily. In this spirit, the European Commission issued a Communication to promote PETs in 2007 [67], 
and privacy-enhancing technologies have become a field of their own within computer science, com-
puter security and cryptography, but also of law, social sciences or economics. However, the mere 
existence of PET concepts or implementations has been proven insufficient to extensively address the 
challenge of supporting the  individual’s  right  to  privacy; privacy cannot be guaranteed by just technol-
ogy, let alone by a few PET components embedded in a bigger ICT system, cf. [148]. 
                                                          
4 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF=11/12/2014&CL=ENG 
5 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ 
6 See results of the FP7 project CONSENT http://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/140471_en.html 
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Hence, privacy needs to be considered from the very beginning of system development. For this rea-
son, Cavoukian7 coined  the  term  “Privacy  by  Design”, that is, privacy should be taken into account 
throughout the entire engineering process from the earliest design stages to the operation of the 
productive system. This holistic approach is promising, but it does not come with mechanisms to in-
tegrate privacy in the development processes of a system. The privacy-by-design approach, i.e. that 
data protection safeguards should be built into products and services from the earliest stage of devel-
opment, has been addressed by the European Commission in their proposal for a General Data Pro-
tection Regulation [159]. This proposal uses the  terms  “privacy  by  design”  and  “data  protection  by  
design”   synonymously.  Article 23  (“Data  protection  by  design  and  by  default”)  would  oblige   those  
entities responsible for processing of personal data to implement appropriate technical and organisa-
tional measures and procedures both at the time of the determination of the means of processing and 
at the time of the processing itself. The General Data Protection Regulation defines a list of principles 
related to personal data processing (cf. Art. 5) that in particular have to be considered (cf. Chapter 3). 
Several researchers and data protection commissioners have published guidelines on how privacy by 
design could be understood [55, 183, 171, 111, 75, 197]. However, many system developers are not 
familiar with privacy principles or technologies that implement them. Their work usually focuses on 
realising functional requirements, where other demands—e.g. privacy or security guarantees—fall 
short as a result. Also, the developing tools provided by software companies hardly considers privacy 
principles. Similarly, data protection authorities currently have limited means to evaluate how well an 
ICT system implements the privacy by design principle. It is not so easy to overcome those shortcom-
ings because there are conceptual difficulties in guaranteeing privacy properties in dynamic systems, 
i.e., systems that adopt to changing requiremetnts. Still, the degree of implementation of privacy prin-
ciples  in  today’s  ICT  landscape and the consideration of privacy requirements in the design process 
could—and should—be considerably increased—no matter whether this will be demanded by law or 
not. 
Objectives of this report 
On this basis, this report aims to contribute to the discussion on how engineering privacy by design 
can be made concretely and effectively. We aim to identify the challenges associated with engineering 
privacy and describe ways to build in privacy in the lifecycle of system development (cf. Chapter 2). 
This approach is substantiated by discussing privacy design strategies which encompass design pat-
terns, data- and process-oriented design strategies, and privacy-enhancing technologies (cf. Chapter 
3). Thereafter we give a structured overview of important privacy technologies (cf. Chapter 4). Further, 
we outline the policy context related to privacy by design (cf. Annex A: ). Finally, we exemplify limits 
to privacy by design and issue recommendations that address system developers, service providers, 
data protection authorities, and policy makers (cf. Chapter5). 
This report provides a basis for better understanding of the current state of the art concerning privacy 
by design. It can be used as repository for system developers who strive to integrate privacy principles 
in their systems. Further, it can be used as a reference for data protection authorities for their tasks 
of monitoring the application of the data protection law as well as providing guidance. Lastly, the 
report should help regulators to better understand the opportunities, challenges and limits of the by-
design principles, to improve the expressiveness and effectiveness of future policy. 
  
                                                          
7Dr. Ann Cavoukian, former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada; for PbD see 
http://www.privacybydesign.ca/ 
Privacy and Data Protection by Design  
– from policy to engineering 
 
December 2014  
  
 
Page  3 
2 Engineering Privacy 
Privacy by design is a multifaceted concept: in legal documents on one hand, it is generally described 
in very broad terms as a general principle; by computer scientists and engineers on the other hand it 
is often equated with the use of specific privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs). However, privacy by 
design is neither a collection of mere general principles nor can it be reduced to the implementation 
of PETs. In fact, it is a process involving various technological and organisational components, which 
implement privacy and data protection principles. These principles and requirements are often de-
rived from law, even though they are often underspecified in the legal sources. 
As any process, privacy by design should have well-defined objectives, methodologies, and evaluation 
means. Currently, the definition of methodologies is not within the scope of the European legal data 
protection framework, but the upcoming European General Data Protection Regulation provides use-
ful indications with regard to objectives and evaluations of a privacy-by-design process, including data 
protection impact assessment, accountability and privacy seals. 
This chapter, we start by summarising important approaches to privacy engineering and related con-
cepts (Section 2.1). On this basis we present privacy and data protection principles derived from the 
legal data protection framework with a focus on the European Union (Section 2.2). Then, we provide 
a general overview of a generalised privacy-by-design process; we define the context and objectives 
(Section 2.3), methodologies (Section 2.4) and evaluation means (Section 2.5). 
2.1 Prior art on privacy engineering 
The understanding of principles concerning privacy and data protection has evolved over the years—
on the international, European and national level8. This report deals with informational privacy of in-
dividuals, i.e. natural persons, and their demands of protection for their personal data starting from 
the  European  legal  data  protection  framework.  The  “privacy  by  design”  procedures  and  tools  that  are  
depicted and discussed in this report may address only parts of the comprehensive privacy and data 
protection concept, or they may go beyond, e.g. by protecting personal data not only of individuals, 
but also of groups, or by supporting anti-censorship requirements. 
Protection of which data?  
The concepts of privacy and data protection must not be reduced to protection of data. In fact, the 
concepts have to be understood more broadly: they address the protection of human beings and their 
personal rights as well as democratic values of society. Keeping this in mind, privacy and data protec-
tion require safeguards concerning specific types of data since data processing may severely threaten 
informational privacy. 
Several terms have been introduced to describe types of data that need to be protected. A term very 
prominently  used  by  industry  is  “personally  identifiable  information  (PII)”,  i.e., data that can be related 
to an individual. Similarly, the European data protection framework centres on “personal  data”.  How-­‐
ever, some authors argue that this falls short since also data that is not related to a single individual 
might still have an impact on the privacy of groups, e.g., an entire group might be discriminated with 
the help of  certain  information.  For  data  of  this  category  the  term  “privacy-relevant  data”  has  been  
                                                          
8 Various definitions for privacy, data protection and related concepts have been proposed. This affects the un-
derstanding of requirements to be realised and supported in legal, organisational and technical systems. The 
terminology  even  diverges  in  different  communities  dealing  with  “privacy  by  design”  or  “data  protection  by  de-­‐
sign”.  However,  we  will  not   join  the  to  some  extent  sophisticated,  yet   justified  debate  on  differences  of the 
various concepts, but focus on similarities to identify overarching principles and approaches. 
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used. Evangelists of the latter school express that privacy protection measures should always be ap-
plied if risks for privacy and data protection cannot be excluded. In several cases data were—at least 
in the beginning—not considered as personal data, but later risks for the privacy of individuals or for 
group  discrimination  based  on  such  data  became  apparent.  “Privacy-relevant  data”  also  comprises  
types of data that contribute to or enable linkage of other data sets and thereby establish a relation 
to a person that has not been visible before, or data that helps to infer sensitive information without 
linkage. For instance, a collection of timestamps may not be seen as PII or personal data, but they 
could contribute to data linkage and thereby may have some influence on  privacy  risks.  Note,  “privacy-
relevant  data”  is  a  super  group  of  PII/personal  data. 
Early approaches 
Early approaches for a globally or supra-nationally harmonised interpretation of what privacy and data 
protection should constitute comprise the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data from 1980 ([151], revised in 2013 [152]) or the Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs, [193], based on a report from 1973 [192]) from the United States Federal State Com-
mission. Also, the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [82] from 1995 is based on similar 
principles (see more on the European policy context in Chapter 6). 
Since the 1970s and driven by a rather technical community, principles for guidance of data processing 
have been proposed. 
Multilateral Security 
The concept of Multilateral Security has been discussed since 1994 [162, 163]: Whereas system design 
very often does not or barely consider the end-users’  interests,  but  primarily  focuses on owners and 
operators of the system, multilateral security demands to take into account the privacy and security 
interests of all parties involved. To realise that, each party should determine the individual interests 
as well as privacy and security goals and express them. This requires that all parties be informed about 
associated advantages (e.g. security gains) and disadvantages (e.g. costs, use of resources, less per-
sonalisation). All these interests and goals would be taken into account for the choice of mechanisms 
to support and realise the demands of all parties. 
Multilateral security aims at specifically empowering end-users to exercise their rights and play an 
active role in deciding on the means of data processing. A prerequisite would be transparent and 
trustworthy ICT systems. In consequence, the idea of multilateral security could implement personal 
control and freedom of choice [204] as  well  as  the  individual’s  right to informational self-determina-
tion [45] which has become the basis of data protection in Germany after a ruling of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court in 1983 and has influenced the discussion on the European level since. 
The approach to multilateral security has been developed in parallel to the first concepts of privacy-
enhancing technologies and later  the  notion  of  “privacy  by  design”.  The  research  on  multilateral  se-­‐
curity took already into account and was inspired by the work of David Chaum and other researchers 
on anonymity and data minimisation (e.g. [57, 59, 60]). Similar challenges as with privacy by design 
have been identified by the multilateral security research community, e.g. the necessity to embed the 
options for privacy in system design because for ICT systems that involve more than one party multi-
lateral security cannot be achieved unilaterally on the end-user’s side. The characteristics and maturity 
of technical components for multilateral security have been analysed in [156]. 
The multilateral security approach addresses the advantages of implementing in privacy features at 
an early stage, at best already in the design phase of conceptualisation. Since the negotiation between 
the parties involved is key for the concept, security and privacy features to choose from should be 
built in, but “privacy  by  default”—at least in the original concept—plays a less important role. 
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Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
New information technologies change the privacy and data protection risks we are facing, that is new 
risks (e.g. through ease of search, cheap data storage) emerge, but technology can also help to mini-
mise or avoid risks to privacy and data protection. Starting in the 1970s the research community and 
most prominently David Chaum explored the field of privacy technologies. For instance technologies 
were proposed for anonymous electronic communication [57], transactions ([59], and payment [60]. 
In 1995, the idea of shaping technology according to privacy principles was discussed among Privacy 
and Data Protection Commissioners. At the time the main principles were data minimisation and iden-
tity protection by anonymisation or pseudonymisation [119, 39].  This  discussion  led  to  the  term  “Pri-­‐
vacy-Enhancing  Technologies  (PETs)”  [119, 40]. 
Development and integration of PETs means built-in privacy and the consideration of the full lifecycle 
of  a  system.  “Privacy  by  default”  is  also  addressed,  in  particular  by  stressing  the  data  minimisation  
principle. 
Global Privacy Standards 
With regard to the globalisation of business practices, international standards on the protection of 
personal data and privacy were needed. Thus in 2006 the International Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners Conference agreed on a set of universal privacy principles that should function as a 
global standard for business practices, regardless of borders [54]. This so-called  “Global  Privacy  Stand-­‐
ard”  has  been  aiming  at  assisting  public  policy  makers  as  well  as  businesses  and  developers  of  tech-­‐
nology. The Global Privacy Standard does not substitute the legal privacy and data protection obliga-
tions in the respective jurisdiction where data processing takes place, but is noteworthy because it 
lists  “accountability”  as  a principle apart and  incorporates  “data  minimisation”  as  part  of  the  “collec-
tion   limitation”  principle. While none of these was mentioned in the European Data Protection Di-
rective   from  1995  and  unanimously   regarded  as   important   for   “privacy  by  design” in the research 
community. 
A further evolved set of principles was adopted at the International Data Protection and Privacy Com-
missioners Conference in 2009: the International Standards on the Protection of Personal Data and 
Privacy—the so-called  “Madrid  Resolution”  [1]—approved by Privacy and Data Protection Authorities 
of over 50 countries. The standards document defines a series of 20 principles and rights that can be 
taken as a base for the development of an internationally binding tool to protect individual rights and 
freedoms at a global level. Representative from large multinational companies have announced to 
support these principles to promote a worldwide framework for privacy protection. However, in con-
trast to the Global Privacy Standard, the Madrid Resolution primarily addresses lawmakers by discuss-
ing how to install a control regime on processing personal data. 
Privacy by Design  
Some may have misunderstood PETs as the panacea that could solve all privacy problems simply by 
adding PET components on top of an existing system. Of course this is hardly ever the case. Clarifica-
tion  was  provided  by  Ann  Cavoukian’s  introduction  of  the  privacy-by-design approach with its seven 
foundational principles [55], particularly by demanding privacy to be embedded into design as a pre-
ventive and proactive measure. 
One year after the Madrid Resolution on worldwide privacy standards, the International Conference 
of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners adopted privacy  by  design  “as  a  holistic  concept  that 
may be applied to operations throughout an organisation, end-to-end, including its information tech-
nology, business practices, processes, physical design and networked   infrastructure”   (the  so-called 
“Privacy  by  Design  Resolution”  [2]). This resolution  states  that  “existing  regulation and policy alone 
Privacy and Data Protection by Design  
– from policy to engineering 
 
December 2014  
  
 
Page  6 
are not fully sufficient to safeguard  privacy”  and  underlines  that  “embedding  privacy  as  the  default 
into the design, operation and management of ICT and systems, across the entire information life 
cycle,  is  necessary  to  fully  protect  privacy”. 
The seven foundational principles are characterising properties rather than instructions for specific 
measures to be taken. Further explanation of how to operationalise privacy by design is provided in 
[56]. Related approaches that emphasise the need of practicability have been proposed in [111], inte-
grating requirements analysis and modelling of attackers, threats and risks, or in [183] which distin-
guishes  between  “privacy-by-policy”  (with  focus  on  notice and  choice  principle)  and  “privacy-by-ar-
chitecture”  (with  focus  on  data  minimisation). 
The Privacy Principles of ISO/IEC 29100 
In  2011,  the  “Privacy  framework”  (ISO/IEC  29100,  [125]) from the International Organisation for Stand-
ardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) was published as an interna-
tional standard. It targets organisations and intends to support them in defining their privacy safe-
guarding requirements. Where legal privacy and data protection requirements exist, the standard is 
to  be  seen  as  complementary.  It  aims  at  enhancing  today’s  security  standards  by  the privacy perspec-
tive whenever personally identifiable information is processed. The target audience of the framework 
are mainly organisations as being responsible entities for data processing; in addition ICT system de-
signers and developers are addressed. 
Although  it  was  developed  within  the  subcommittee  “IT  Security  techniques”  (SC  27),  the  standard  
goes beyond IT security by explicitly linking to ISO/IEC 27000 concepts and demonstrating their corre-
spondences to each other. Beside eleven elaborated privacy principles the privacy framework com-
prises a brief description of a common privacy terminology, the actors and their roles in processing 
personally identifiable information, privacy safeguarding requirements and controls. 
Privacy Protection Goals 
Protection goals aim to provide abstract, i.e. context independent properties for IT systems. In ICT 
security the triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability has been widely accepted. While several 
extensions and refinements have been proposed, these core protection goals remained stable over 
decades and served as basis for many ICT security methodologies; developers are familiar with them 
and employ them to structure the identification of risks and choosing appropriate safeguards. 
As complement to these security protection goals, three privacy-specific protection goals were pro-
posed in 2009 [172], namely unlinkability, transparency, and intervenability. These were further re-
fined in [116, 158], and embedded in a standardised data protection model that is being acknowl-
edged by the Data Protection Authorities in Germany and proposed for use on the European level 
[170, 36]. 
x Unlinkability ensures that privacy-relevant data cannot be linked across domains that are con-
stituted by a common purpose and context, and that means that processes have to be oper-
ated in such a way that the privacy-relevant data are unlinkable to any other set of privacy-
relevant data outside of the domain.9 
                                                          
9 Note  that  this  definition  of  “unlinkability”  focuses  on  separating  domains  characterised  by  purpose  and  con-­‐
text, as this is being done in many data protection laws. Of course stricter unlinkability realisations (see e.g. 
[150]) may support this goal as well. 
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Unlinkability is related to the principles of necessity and data minimisation as well as purpose 
binding. Mechanisms to achieve or support unlinkability comprise of data avoidance, separa-
tion of contexts (physical separation, encryption, usage of different identifiers, access con-
trol), anonymisation and pseudonymisation, and early erasure or data. 
x Transparency. Transparency ensures that all privacy-relevant data processing including the 
legal, technical and organisational setting can be understood and reconstructed at any time. 
The information has to be available before, during and after the processing takes place. Thus, 
transparency has to cover not only the actual processing, but also the planned processing (ex-
ante transparency) and the time after the processing has taken place to know what exactly 
happened (ex-post transparency). The level of how much information to provide and in which 
way it should be communicated best has to be tailored according to the capabilities of the 
target audience, e.g. the data controller, the user, an internal auditor or the supervisory au-
thority. 
Transparency is related to the principles concerning openness and it is a prerequisite for ac-
countability. Mechanisms for achieving or supporting transparency comprise logging and re-
porting, an understandable documentation covering technology, organisation, responsibili-
ties, the source code, privacy policies, notifications, information of and communication with 
the persons whose data are being processed. 
x Intervenability. Intervenability ensures intervention is possible concerning all ongoing or 
planned privacy-relevant data processing, in particular by those persons whose data are pro-
cessed. The objective of intervenability is the application of corrective measures and counter-
balances where necessary. 
Intervenability is related to the principles concerning individuals’  rights,  e.g. the rights to rec-
tification and erasure of data, the right to withdraw consent or the right to lodge a claim or to 
raise a dispute to achieve remedy. Moreover, intervenability is important for other stakehold-
ers, e.g. for data controllers to effectively control the data processor and the used IT systems 
to influence or stop the data processing at any time. Mechanisms for achieving or supporting 
intervenability comprise established processes for influencing or stopping the data processing 
fully or partially, manually overturning an automated decision, data portability precautions to 
prevent lock-in at a data processor, breaking glass policies, single points of contact for individ-
uals’   intervention  requests,  switches   for  users   to  change  a  setting (e.g. changing to a non-
personalised, empty-profile configuration), or deactivating an auto pilot or a monitoring sys-
tem for some time. Note these mechanisms often need the cooperation of the service pro-
vider (often referred as honest-but-curious-attacker model).  
Working with protection goals means to balance the requirements derived from the six protection 
goals (ICT security and privacy) concerning data, technical and organisational processes. Considera-
tions on lawfulness, fairness and accountability provide guidance for balancing the requirements and 
deciding on design choices and appropriate safeguards. 
2.2 Deriving privacy and data protection principles from the legal framework 
The above described principles and mechanisms do need to be reflected in legislation to be effective. 
In this report we focus on the EU perspective. The main principles from the European legal data pro-
tection context are summarised and briefly discussed. Thereby, references to the European Data Pro-
tection Directive 95/46/EC (in short: DPD) [82], to Opinions of the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party (based on Art. 29 DPD) and to the proposed European General Data Protection Regulation (in 
short: GDPR) [159] are given. 
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Lawfulness 
According to European data protection law, the processing of personal data is only allowed if (a) the 
individual  whose  personal  data  are  being  processed  (in  the  European  legal  framework  called  “data  
subject”)  has  unambiguously given consent, or processing is necessary (b) for the performance of a 
contract, (c) for compliance with a legal obligation, (d) in order to protect vital interests of the data 
subject, (e) for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, or (f) for the purposes of 
legitimate interests pursued by the data processing entities if such interests are not overridden by the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.  
“Personal  data”  means  any  information  relating  to  an  identified  or  identifiable  natural  person—for a 
detailed discussion see [19]. This is related to the term personally identifiable information (PII), as e.g. 
used in the privacy framework standardised by ISO/IEC [125]. 
This very basic principle of lawfulness is not internationally harmonised, i.e., while in several countries 
outside Europe processing of personal data is permitted unless it is explicitly forbidden, in the EU 
processing is usually forbidden unless there is an explicit permission, e.g. by  the  individual’s  consent  
or by statutory provisions. 
Note that for legally compliant data processing regulatory norms other than such concerning privacy 
need to be considered. Some of them contain requirements colliding with well-known privacy and 
data protection principles, e.g. legally demanded data retention overruling data minimisation consid-
erations. 
References to European data protection law 
• Art. 7 DPD, 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  the  concept  of  personal  data”  [19], 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  the  notion  of  legitimate  interests  of  the  
data  controller”  [22], 
• Art. 5(1) point (a)  GDPR  principles  “lawfulness,  fairness  and  transparency”,  and 
• Art.  6  GDPR  “lawfulness  of  processing”. 
Consent 
The term consent is further specified in the legal framework. To enable lawful data processing of indi-
viduals’  personal  identifiable information, individuals need to give specific, informed and explicit indi-
cation of their intentions with respect to the processing of their data. A declaration of consent is inva-
lid if not all these requirements are met. Hence, transparency is a prerequisite for consent. Further-
more, consent can be withdrawn with effect for the future. Consent is related to the right to informa-
tional self-determination [45] and by this an expression of the individuals’ freedoms in general. How-
ever, in practice many individuals are not sufficiently informed, or the consent is not freely given. In 
the opinion of the authors, this deplorable situation occurs due to two issues, namely the way consent 
is asked is too complex, and the individuals’ focus is on another topic, at the moment consent is asked. 
This  observation  has  been  made  not  only  in  the  field  of  privacy  and  data  protection  with  “take  it  or  
leave  it”  apps  or  contracts  in  legalese,  but  also  when  signing  consent  forms  for  medical  measures  or  
bank statements. This has discredited the concept of consent. 
References to European data protection law 
• Art. 2 point (h) DPD, 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party  “Opinion  on  the  definition  of  consent”  [19], 
• Art.  4(8)  GDPR  definition  of  the  “data  subject’s  consent”, and 
• Art.  7  GDPR  “conditions  for  consent”. 
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Purpose binding 
Personal data obtained for one purpose must not be processed for other purposes that are not com-
patible with the original purpose. The purpose has to be legitimate, and it has to be specified and 
made explicit before collecting personal data. 
In many countries outside Europe, the principle of purpose limitation or purpose binding is unknown. 
Instead, it is encouraged to use data for multiple purposes. Big Data is one of the big trends that in-
corporates multi-purpose linkage and analysis of data instead of leaving them in separated domains. 
References to European data protection law 
• Art. 6(1) points (b)-(e) DPD, 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  purpose  limitation”  [18], 
• Art. 29 Data Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  personal  data”  [19], 
• Art.  5(1)  point  (b)  GDPR  principle  “purpose  limitation”,  also 
• Art. 5(1) points (c)-(e) GDPR, and 
• Art. 21(2a) GDPR. 
Necessity and data minimisation 
Only personal data necessary for the respective purpose may be processed, i.e. in the collection stage 
and in the following processing stage, personal data has to be fully avoided or minimised as much as 
possible. Consequently, personal data must be erased or effectively anonymised as soon as it is not 
anymore needed for the given purpose. Although data minimisation at the earliest stage of processing 
is a core concept of privacy-enhancing technologies cf. [119, 40], and it has been mentioned explicitly 
in the Global Privacy Standard of 2006, it has not been well enforced, yet. 
References to European data protection law 
• Art. 7 DPD, 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  anonymisation  techniques”  [16], 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  the  application  of  necessity  and  propor-­‐
tionality  concepts  and  data  protection  within  the  law  enforcement  sector”  [21], 
• Art.  5(1)  point  (c)  GDPR  principle  “data  minimisation”, 
• Art.  5(1)  point  (e)  GDPR  principle  “storage  minimisation”, and 
• Art.  23  GDPR  “data  protection  by  design  and  by  default”. 
Transparency and openness 
Transparency and openness mean that the relevant stakeholders get sufficient information about the 
collection and use of their personal data. Furthermore, it needs to be ensured that they understand 
possible risks induced by the processing and actions they can take to control the processing. 
Transparency is a necessary requirement for fair data processing, since (1) individuals need infor-
mation to exercise their rights, (2) data controllers need to evaluate their processors, and (3) Data 
Protection Authorities need to monitor according to their responsibilities. Currently, the transparency 
level is entirely inadequate whereas the complexity of data processing and system interaction is fur-
ther increasing. However, full transparency might not be possible (nor desirable) due to law enforce-
ment requirements and business secrets. 
References to European data protection law 
• Art. 10 DPD, Art. 11 DPD and Art. 14 DPD (obligations to inform the data subject), 
• Art.  12  (a)  (“right  of  access”), 
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• Art. 29 Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  more  harmonised  information  provisions”  
[20], 
• Art.  5(1)  point  (a)  GDPR  (principles  “lawfulness,  fairness  and  transparency”), 
• Art.  10a  GDPR  (“general  principles  for  data  subject  rights”), 
• Art.  11  GDPR  (“concise,  transparent,  clear  and  easily  accessible  policies”), 
• Art.  13a  GDPR  (“standardised  information  policies”), 
• Art.  14  GDPR  (“information  to  the  data  subject”), 
• Art.  15  (“right  to  access  and  to  obtain  data  for  the  data  subject”),  and 
• Art. 12 (for defining the conditions for exercising data subject rights). 
Rights of the individual 
Individuals have right to access and rectify as well as (constrained) to block and erase their personal 
data. Further they have the right to withdraw given consent with effect for the future. These rights 
should be supported in a way that individuals can effectively and conveniently exercise their rights.  
The implementation, or at least support, of these rights is promoted by the privacy by design principle 
that demands considering the user and the one that stipulates privacy by default. 
References to European data protection law 
• Art.  12  point  (b)  and  (c)  DPD  (“right  of  access”,  in  point  (b)  in  particular:  the  rectification,  eras-­‐
ure or blocking of data if appropriate), 
• Art.  14  DPD  (“right  to  object”), 
• Art.  5  No.  1  (ea)  GDPR  (principle  “effectiveness”), 
• Art. 7(3) GDPR (right to withdraw consent at any time), 
• Art.  10a  GDPR  (“general  principles  for  data  subject  rights”), 
• Art.  13  GDPR  (“notification  requirement  in  the  event  of  rectification  and  erasure”), 
• Art.  17  GDPR  (“right  to  erasure”), 
• Art.  19  GDPR  (“right  to  object”),  and 
• Art. 12 (for defining the conditions for exercising data subject rights). 
Information security 
Information security addresses the protection goals confidentiality, integrity, availability. All of these 
goals are important also from a privacy and data protection perspective that specifically requires that 
unauthorised access and processing, manipulation, loss, destruction and damage are prevented. Fur-
ther, the data have to be accurate. Moreover, the organisational and technical processes for appro-
priately handling the data and providing the possibility for individuals to exercise their rights have to 
be available whenever necessary. This principle calls for appropriate technical and organisational safe-
guards. 
References to European data protection law 
• Art.  16  DPD  “Confidentiality  of  processing”, 
• Art.  17  DPD  “Security  of  processing”, 
• Art.  5  No.  1  (d)  GDPR  (principle  “accuracy”), 
• Art.  5  No.  1  (ea)  GDPR  (principle  “integrity”), 
• Art.  30  GDPR  “Security  of  processing”,  and 
• Art.  50  GDPR  (“Professional  secrecy”). 
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Accountability 
Accountability means to ensure and to be able to demonstrate the compliance with privacy and data 
protection principles (or legal requirements). This requires clear responsibilities, internal and external 
auditing and controlling of all data processing. In some organisations, Data Protection Officers are 
installed to perform internal audits and handle complaints. A means for demonstrating compliance 
can be a data protection impact assessment. 
On a national level, accountability is supported by independent Data Protection Authorities for moni-
toring and checking as supervisory bodies.  
References to European data protection law 
• In the DPD, accountability is not directly stated, but aspects of the principle can be seen, 
among others, in Art. 17 DPD (Security of processing) or by mentioning the possibility of ap-
pointing  a  “personal  data  protection  official”   in  Art.  18  DPD  who  should  be responsible for 
ensuring the application of data protection law. 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “The  Future  of  Privacy”  [23], 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “Opinion  on  the  principle  of  accountability”  [17], 
• Art.  5(1)  point  (f)  GDPR  and  Art.  22  GDPR  (“Responsibility  and  accountability of the control-
ler”), 
• Art.  33  GDPR  (“Data  protection  impact  assessment”),  and 
• Art.  35  GDPR  (“Designation  of  the  data  protection  officer”). 
Data protection by design and by default 
The principle  “Privacy/data  protection  by  design” is based on the insight that building in privacy fea-
tures from the beginning of the design process is preferable over the attempt to adapt a product or 
service at a later stage. The involvement in the design process supports the consideration of the full 
lifecycle of the data and its usage. 
The  principle  “Privacy/data  protection  by  default”  means  that  in  the  default  setting the user is already 
protected against privacy risks. This affects the choice of the designer which parts are wired-in and 
which are configurable [117]. In many cases, a privacy-respecting default would not allow an extended 
functionality of the product, unless the user explicitly chooses it. 
References to European data protection law 
• In the DPD, data protection by design is rather indirectly addressed, e.g. in Art. 17 DPD (Secu-
rity of processing) where appropriate safeguards are demanded, even if this provision was 
mainly directed to security instead of privacy guarantees. 
• Art.  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party:  “The  Future  of  Privacy”  [23], and 
• Art. 23 GDPR  (“Data  protection  by  design  and  by  default”). 
2.3 Definition of the context and objectives 
As discussed in the introduction, the integration of privacy requirements in the design of a system is 
not a simple task. First privacy in itself is a complex, multifaceted and contextual notion. In addition, 
it is generally not the primary requirement of a system and it may even come into conflict with other 
(functional or non-functional) requirements. It is therefore of paramount importance to define pre-
cisely the goals of a privacy by design process. These goals should form the starting point of the pro-
cess itself and the basis of its evaluation. One way to define the objectives of the system in terms of 
privacy is to conduct a preliminary Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) or a privacy risk analysis. In fact, 
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PIAs or “data  protection  impact  assessment”—we use both expression interchangeably in this docu-
ment—are required in certain situations by the GDPR which stipulates that its results should be taken 
into account in the privacy by design process,  cf.  GDPR,  Paragraph  1  of  Article  23;  “Data  protection by 
design shall have particular regard to the entire lifecycle management of personal data from collection 
to processing to deletion, systematically focusing on comprehensive procedural safeguards regarding 
the accuracy, confidentiality, integrity, physical security and deletion of personal data. Where the con-
troller has carried out a data protection impact assessment pursuant to Article 33, the results shall be 
taken into account  when  developing  those  measures  and  procedures.” 
Recently considerable efforts have been put on PIAs, namely, several handbooks have been published 
and more and more PIAs are conducted in different countries. The interested reader can find an out-
line of the current situation in [206] and more detailed accounts in [206, 207]. A PIA can be a more or 
less heavy process, including different organisational, decision making and technical tasks, with PIA 
reports varying from a page and a half to more than one hundred and fifty pages. From a technical 
point of view, the core steps of a PIA are: 
1. the identification of stakeholders and consulting of these stakeholders, 
2. the identification of risks (taking into account the perception of the stakeholders), 
3. the identification of solutions and formulation of recommendations, 
4. the implementation of the recommendations, 
5. reviews, audits and accountability measures. 
The inputs of the privacy by design process per se should be the outputs of the second step (risk anal-
ysis) and third step10 (recommendations) and its output contributes to step 4 (implementation of the 
recommendations11). In fact, it could be argued that privacy by design actually encompasses the entire 
process (including the PIA itself), but we focus on the actual design phase in this document. Regardless 
of the chosen definitions, it should be emphasised that privacy by design is an iterative, continuous 
process and PIAs can be conducted at different stages of this process. 
The key step of a PIA with respect to privacy by design is therefore the risk analysis. A wide range of 
methods have been defined for IT security risk analysis [137] but much less are dedicated to privacy 
risk analysis [66, 75, 150]. The OASIS Privacy Management Reference Model and Methodology 
(PMRM) [44] includes a general methodology for analysing privacy policies and their privacy manage-
ment requirements but it does not provide a precise risk analysis method. The only few existing pri-
vacy risk analysis methods are actually adaptations or transpositions of security risk analyses to pri-
vacy, for example the EBIOS method in [66] or STRIDE in [75].  
As an illustration, the core of the risk analysis method published by the French Commission Nationale 
Informatique et Libertés (CNIL) is the identification  of  the  “feared  events”  (the  events  that  should  be  
prevented) and the threats (what can make the feared events happen). Examples of feared events can 
be the illegal use of personal information for advertising emails or the failure of the data controller to 
comply with the deletion obligation leading to outdated or incorrect data that can be used to deprive 
subjects from their rights (employment, social benefits, etc.). The level of severity of a feared event is 
derived from two parameters: the level of identification of the personal data (how easy it is to identify 
data subjects from the asset at risk) and the level of damage (potential impact of the feared event for 
the subject). As far as threats are concerned, their likelihood is calculated from the vulnerabilities of 
the supporting assets (to what extent the features of the supporting assets can be exploited in order 
                                                          
10 Step 3 can be a set of general recommendations about the system rather than a precise, well-defined design. 
A PIA can also be applied to an already existing system or a system whose architecture has already been defined, 
in which case privacy by design and risk analysis are more interwoven. 
11 Some of the recommendations of a PIA are not technical. 
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to carry out a threat) and the capabilities of the risk sources (attackers) to exploit these vulnerabilities 
(skills, available time, financial resources, closeness to the system, motivation, etc.). Each privacy risk 
consisting of a feared event and the associated threats can then be plotted in a two-dimensional (like-
lihood and severity) space. Depending on its position in this space, a risk  can  be  classified  as  “to  be  
absolutely  avoided”,  “to  be mitigated”  (to  reduce  its likelihood and/or severity), or  “acceptable”  (very  
unlikely and with minor impact). The CNIL method itself is rather general and high-level but it is sup-
plemented by a catalogue of good practices to help data controllers in their task (to evaluate the im-
pact of the threat events, to identify the sources of risks, to select measures proportionate to the risks, 
etc.). 
The LINDDUN methodology12 broadly shares the principles of the CNIL method but it puts forwards a 
more systematic approach based on data flow diagrams and privacy threat tree patterns. The first step 
of the method consists in building a data flow diagram providing a high-level description of the system. 
A data flow diagram involves entities (e.g. users), processes (e.g. a social network service), data stores 
(e.g. database) and data flows between the entities. The second step consists in mapping privacy 
threats to components of the data flow diagram (e.g. associating  the  “identifiability  of  the  subject”  
threat to the  “database”  component).  The  methodology  considers  seven  types  of  threats13: linkability, 
identifiability of the subject, non-repudiation, detectability of an item of interest, information disclo-
sure, content unawareness, policy, and consent non-compliance. The third step is the identification of 
more precise misuse scenarios. To this aim, LINDDUN provides a catalogue of threat tree patterns 
showing the preconditions for a privacy attack scenario (in the form of AND/OR trees). A precondition 
is typically a vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker having the necessary means to conduct 
an attack. Privacy requirements can then be elicited from the misuse cases. Just like in the CNIL meth-
odology, the severity level of the privacy threats has to be evaluated, risks have to be prioritised and 
privacy requirements can be addressed in different ways (ranging from removing a feature of the sys-
tem, warning the user, taking organisational measures and using privacy-enhancing technologies). The 
choice of appropriate privacy-enhancing technologies is facilitated by correspondence tables associ-
ating privacy objectives and data flow components with PETs. 
Whatever method is used, a risk analysis should therefore provide useful inputs to the design process: 
assumptions on the context (including the external environment, the attackers and their capabilities), 
precise privacy objectives for the system, and potentially suggestions of privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies. Even if no formal PIA or risk analysis methodology is conducted, these inputs should be defined 
at the very beginning of the process since otherwise the objectives of the privacy by design process 
itself would not be well-defined. 
2.4 Methodologies 
When the objectives and assumptions on the context are defined, the challenge for designers is to 
find the appropriate privacy-enhancing techniques and protocols and combine them to meet the re-
quirements of the system. A first hurdle to be overcome are the potential conflicts or inconsistencies 
between privacy objectives and the other (functional and non-functional) requirements of the system. 
Another source of complexity is the fact that there exists a huge spectrum of PETs, their specifications 
can be subtle and understanding how to combine them to achieve a given purpose is cumbersome 
and error prone. We discuss PETs in Chapter 5 in more detail. 
For the above reasons, the development of appropriate methodologies or development tools for pri-
vacy by design has been advocated or studied by several research groups during the last decade [14, 
                                                          
12 https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/linddun/ 
13 Which is the origin of the mnemonic LINDDUN acronym. 
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13, 111, 120, 131, 44, 187]. A way to face the complexity of the task is to define the privacy by design 
methodology at the level of architectures [14, 135]. Indeed, most of the reasons identified in [27] why 
architectures matter are relevant for privacy by design [14]: first, they are the carriers of the earliest 
and hence most fundamental hardest-to-change design decisions; in addition, they reduce design and 
system complexity because they make it possible to abstract away unnecessary details and to focus 
on critical issues. Architectures can therefore help designers reason about privacy requirements and 
the combination of PETs which could be used to meet them. 
If the choice is made to work  at  the  architectural  level,  the  next  question  is:  “how  to  define,  represent  
and  use  architectures?”  In  practice,  architectures  are  often  described  in  a  pictorial  way,  using  different  
kinds of graphs with legends defining the meaning of nodes and vertices, or semi-formal representa-
tions such as UML diagrams (class diagrams, use case diagrams, sequence diagrams, communication 
diagrams, etc.). When stronger guarantees are needed, it is also possible to rely on formal (mathe-
matical) methods to prove that, based on appropriate assumptions on the PETs involved, a given ar-
chitecture meets the privacy requirements of the system. 
Whatever the chosen level of description and representation language for the system, the following 
key criteria have to be considered in a privacy by design methodology: 
• Trust assumptions. A key decision which has to be made during the design phase is the 
choice of the trust relationships between the stakeholders: this choice is a driving factor in 
the selection of architectural options and PETs. Any disclosure of personal data is conditional 
upon a form of trust between the discloser and the recipient. Different types of trust can be 
distinguished such as blind trust, verifiable trust, and verified trust [14, 13]. Blind trust is the 
strongest form of trust; from a technical point of view it could lead to the weakest solutions, 
the ones most vulnerable to misplaced trust. Verifiable trust falls between the two other op-
tions: trust is granted by default but verifications can be carried out a posteriori (for example 
using commitments and spot checks) to check that the trusted party has not cheated. In con-
trast,  verified  trust  amounts,  technically  speaking,  to  a  “no  trust”  option;  it  relies  on  crypto-­‐
graphic algorithms and protocols (such as zero knowledge proofs, secure multiparty compu-
tation or homomorphic encryption) to guarantee, by construction, the desired property. Fur-
thermore the amount of trust necessary can be reduced by the use of cryptographic tech-
niques or distribution of data. Other forms of trust, involving groups of stakeholders, can 
also be considered. For instance, distributed trust is a form of trust that depends on the as-
sumption that the data is split between several entities that are assumed not to collude (or 
at least a minimum fraction of them). 
• Involvement of the user. The second batch of decisions to be taken by the designer is the 
types of interactions with the users. For some systems (smart metering, electronic traffic 
pricing, etc.) it may be the case that no interaction with the user is necessary to get his con-
sent (which is supposed to have been delivered through other, non-technical means, or 
which is not required because it is not the legal ground for the collection of the data) or to 
allow him to exercise his rights. In other cases, these interactions have to be implemented, 
which means that several questions have to be addressed by the designer: what information 
is communicated to the user, in what form and at what time(s)? What initiatives can the 
user take, through what means, at what time(s)? Great care should be taken that the inter-
face of the system allows subjects to exercise all their rights (informed consent, access, cor-
rection, deletion, etc.) without undue constraints. 
• Technical constraints. Some constraints on the environment usually have to be taken into 
account such as, for example, the fact that a given input data is located in a specific area, 
provided by a sensor that may have limited capacities, or the existence (or lack of) communi-
cation channel between two components. 
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• Architecture. The answers to the above questions usually make it possible to significantly re-
duce the design space. The last stage is then the definition of the architecture, including the 
type of components used, the stakeholders controlling them, the localisation of the compu-
tations, the communication links and information flows between the components. 
This methodology should be supported by appropriate libraries of privacy design strategies and PETs 
to help the designers in the last “creative”  step  (choice  of  the  architecture  and  components).  Existing  
privacy by design strategies and PETs are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively. 
The privacy by design approach is a continuous, iterative process [44] and various events (such as the 
availability of new PETs or attacks on existing technologies) can call for a reordering of priorities or 
reconsideration of certain assumptions. As for any process, it is also necessary to be able to evaluate 
its result as discussed in the next section. 
2.5 Evaluation means  
The application of a well-defined privacy by design process is not by itself an absolute guarantee that 
the system will comply with all its privacy requirements. In addition, the accountability principle stip-
ulates that data controllers must be able to demonstrate compliance to internal and external auditors. 
This  obligation  is  enshrined  in  the  GDPR:  “Impact  assessments  can  only  be  of  help  if  controllers  make  
sure that they comply with the promises originally laid down in them. Data controllers should there-
fore conduct periodic data protection compliance reviews demonstrating that the data processing 
mechanisms in place comply with assurances made in the data protection impact assessment. It 
should further demonstrate the ability of the data controller to comply with the autonomous choices 
of data subjects. In addition, in case the review finds compliance inconsistencies, it should highlight 
these  and  present  recommendations  on  how  to  achieve  full  compliance.”14 This demonstration can 
take place at different times and in different ways. To clarify this, Colin Bennett has distinguished three 
layers of accountability [33]: accountability of policy, accountability of procedures, and accountability 
of practice. The first two types of accountability amount to have appropriate documents available 
defining the privacy policies implemented by the system, i.e. documentation of privacy requirements15 
and the internal mechanisms and procedures in place (such as PIA, complaint handling procedure, 
staff training, existence of a privacy officer, etc.) need to be in place. The third type of accountability 
is more demanding: to comply with accountability of practice, data controllers must be able to demon-
strate that their actual data handling complies with their obligations. To do so, it is generally necessary 
to keep audit logs and these logs must also comply with other privacy principles such as the data 
minimisation principle (only the personal data necessary for the audits should be recorded) and secu-
rity obligation (audit logs should not represent an additional source of risks for personal data). Solu-
tions have been proposed to define the information to be recorded in the logs [48, 47] and to ensure 
their security [178, 30, 203].  
Privacy certification   or   “privacy   seals”,  which   are   also   promoted   by   the   GDPR16, provide another 
framework for privacy assessment. Privacy seals have been characterised as follows in [169]:  “A  pri-­‐
                                                          
14 Paragraph 74(a) of the Recitals 
15 These requirements should be as defined by the PIA or risk analysis process 
16 “In  order   to  enhance  transparency  and  compliance  with  this  Regulation,   the  establishment  of certification 
mechanisms, data protection seals and standardised marks should be encouraged, allowing data subjects to 
quickly,  reliably  and  verifiably  assess  the  level  of  data  protection  of  relevant  products  and  services.  A  “European  
Data Protection Seal”  should  be  established  on  the  European  level  to  create  trust  among  data  subjects,  legal  
certainty for controllers, and at the same time export European data protection standards by allowing non-
European companies to more easily enter European markets by being  certified.”  (Article  77  of  the  Recitals) 
Privacy and Data Protection by Design  
– from policy to engineering 
 
December 2014  
  
 
Page  16 
vacy seal is a certification mark or a guarantee issued by a certification entity verifying an organisa-
tion’s  adherence  to  certain  specified  privacy  standards.  A  privacy  seal  is  a  visible,  public  indication of 
an organisation’s  subscription  to  established,  largely  voluntary  privacy  standards  that  aim  to  promote  
consumer trust and confidence in e-commerce”.  In  fact,  privacy  seals  and  certificates  are  already  in  
operation, with different targets: some of them apply to websites17, others to procedures18, other to 
products, etc. Regardless of their target, the most important criteria to establish the value of a privacy 
seal are the following:  
• What is the certification entity and what are the mechanisms in place to ensure that it is trust-
worthy? The ideal situation is when an independent, official body issues the certificate (even 
though the evaluation itself can be conducted by accredited laboratories such as in the Com-
mon Criteria for security19). 
• What is the scope of the certification? In the context of privacy by design, we are mostly in-
terested in the certification of products but even then, the precise scope of the evaluation has 
to be defined (a product can be part of a system) as well as the assumptions on its environ-
ment (stakeholders, expected use, etc.).  
• What are the privacy requirements or standards used for the evaluation? Each privacy seal 
subscribes to its own standards or criteria (for example the EuroPriSe criteria20) which can be 
more or less demanding. If a PIA or a risk analysis has been conducted, it should provide (or 
be included into) the privacy requirements of the product, and a privacy seal that would not 
take such requirements into account would not provide sufficient guarantees. In any case, the 
reference for the evaluation should be precisely documented. 
• How is the result of the certification communicated to the users? This issue is especially critical 
when the seal or certificate is supposed to provide information to end-users such as in the 
case of websites [189]. For more business oriented certificates, the result of the evaluation 
should describe without ambiguity the scope of the evaluation, the privacy requirements, the 
level of assurance and the result of the evaluation (which may include observations or recom-
mendations about the use of the product).  
In practice, the added value of a privacy seal or certificate should be an increased confidence in the 
fact that a product meets its privacy requirements. This increased confidence ultimately depends on 
the trust that can be placed in the certification body and history has shown that this trust is not always 
well deserved. As shown by several authors, this can have a counterproductive effect in terms of pri-
vacy  because  privacy  seals  can  create  an  “illusion  of  privacy”   leading  users  to  disclose  more   infor-­‐
mation than they would do in the absence of a seal [169]. Different models of co-regulation are sug-
gested in [169] to avoid this deceptive effect and create an appropriate environment for future privacy 
seals.  
3 Privacy Design Strategies  
3.1 Software design patterns, strategies, and technologies21 
In this section we will develop the notion of a design strategy, and explain how it differs from both a 
design pattern and a (privacy-enhancing) technology.  
                                                          
17 The interested reader can find in [180] an overview of online security and privacy seals. 
18 http://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/labels-cnil/procedures-daudit/ 
19 https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/  
20 https://www.european-privacy-seal.eu/EPS-en/Home 
21 This section is based on [118]. 
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Software architecture involves the set of significant decisions about the organisation of a software 
system22. It includes the selection of the structural elements, the interfaces by which a system is com-
posed from these elements, the specified behaviour when those elements collaborate, the composi-
tion of these structural and behavioural elements into a larger subsystem, and the architectural style 
that guides this organisation.  
Several software development methodologies exist. In the waterfall model, software system develop-
ment proceeds in six phases: concept development, analysis, design, implementation, testing and 
evaluation. Systems are never developed in one go. Typically several iterations are involved, both be-
fore and after an initial version is released to the public. Therefore, software development in practice 
proceeds in a cycle, where after evaluation a new iteration starts by updating the concept as appro-
priate.  
To support privacy by design throughout the software development each of these phases rely on dif-
ferent concepts. In the concept development and analysis phases so called privacy design strategies 
(defined further on) are necessary. The known concept of a design pattern is useful during the design 
phase, whereas concrete (privacy-enhancing) technologies can only be applied during the implemen-
tation phase.  
3.1.1 Design patterns  
Design patterns are useful for making design decisions about the organisation of a software system. A 
design  pattern  “provides a scheme for refining the subsystems or components of a software system, 
or the relationships between them. It describes a commonly recurring structure of communicating com-
ponents that solves a general design problem within a particular context.”  [46]  
This allows a system designer to solve a problem by breaking it down into smaller, more manageable, 
sub-problems, without bogging the designer with implementation details. At the same time, the pat-
tern clearly describes the consequences of the proposed subdivision, allowing the designer to deter-
mine whether the application of that pattern achieves the overall goal. This is why the description 
[104] of a design pattern typically contains the following elements: its name, purpose, context (the 
situations in which it applies), implementation (its structure, components and their relationships), and 
the consequences (its results, side effects and trade-offs when applied). An example of a software 
design pattern is the Model-View-Controller23 that separates the representation of the data (the 
model) from the way it is presented towards the user (the view) and how the user can interact with 
that data (using the controller).  
In the context of privacy by design, few design patterns have been explicitly described as such to date. 
We are aware of the work of Hafiz [113, 114], Pearson [155, 154], van Rest et al. [197], and a recent 
initiative of the UC Berkeley School of Information24. Many more implicit privacy design patterns exist 
though, although they have never been described as such. We will encounter some of them a bit fur-
ther in this report.  
3.1.2 Design strategies  
Many design patterns are very specific, and therefore cannot be applied directly in the concept devel-
opment phase. However, there exist design patterns of a higher level of abstraction, called architec-
ture patterns. Such  architecture  patterns  “express a fundamental structural organisation or schema 
                                                          
22 Based on an original definition by Mary Shaw, expanded in 1995 by Grady Booch, Kurt Bittner, Philippe Kruch-
ten and Rich Reitman as reported in [130]. 
23 Originally formulated in the late 1970s by Trygve Reenskaug at Xerox PARC, as part of the Smalltalk system. 
24 http://privacypatterns.org/ 
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for software systems. They provide a set of predefined subsystems, specify their responsibilities, and 
include rules and guidelines for organising the relationships between them.”25 
Some people consider the Model-View-Controller pattern introduced above such an architecture pat-
tern. The distinction between an architecture pattern and a design pattern is not always easily made, 
however. It does show that one can look at system design at varying levels of abstraction, and that 
concrete design patterns have been too specific to be readily applicable in certain cases. In fact, there 
are even more general principles that guide the system architecture. We choose, therefore, to express 
such higher level abstractions in terms of design strategies. These are defined as follows [120].  
A design strategy describes a fundamental approach to achieve a certain design goal. It favours certain 
structural organisations or schemes over others. It has certain properties that allow it to be distin-
guished from other (fundamental) approaches that achieve the same goal.  
Whether something classifies as a strategy very much depends on the universe of discourse, and in 
particular on the exact goal the strategy aims to achieve. In general we observe that a privacy design 
strategy is a design strategy that achieves (some level of) privacy protection as its goal.  
Design strategies do not necessarily impose a specific structure on the system although they certainly 
limit the possible structural realisations of it. Therefore, they are also applicable during the concept 
development and analysis phase of the development cycle26.  
3.1.3  Privacy-enhancing technologies  
When talking about privacy by design, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) are well known, and 
have been studied in depth for decades now. (This large body of knowledge is summarised further on 
in this report.) A well-known definition, and one that was later adopted almost literally by the Euro-
pean Commission [67], was given by Borking and Blarkom et al. [39, 195] as follows:  
“Privacy-Enhancing Technologies is a system of ICT measures protecting informational privacy by elim-
inating or minimising personal data thereby preventing unnecessary or unwanted processing of per-
sonal data, without the loss of the functionality of the information system.”   
In principle, PETs are used to implement a certain privacy design pattern with concrete technology. 
For  example,  both  ‘Idemix’  [49] and  ‘U-Prove’  [42] are privacy-enhancing technologies implementing 
the (implicit) design pattern anonymous credentials. There are many more examples of privacy-en-
hancing  technologies,  like  ‘cut-and-choose’  techniques  [60],  ‘onion  routing’  [57] to name but a few.  
3.2 Eight privacy design strategies  
We will now briefly summarise the eight privacy design strategies as derived by Hoepman [120] from 
the legal principles underlying data protection legislation. This work distinguishes data oriented strat-
egies (described first) and process oriented strategies (described after that).  
3.2.1 Data oriented strategies  
The following four data oriented strategies can support the unlinkability protection goal (see Section 
2.1) and primarily address the principles of necessity and data minimisation (see Section 2.2). 
                                                          
25 See http://best-practice-software-engineering.ifs.tuwien.ac.at/patterns.html, and The Open Group Architec-
ture Framework (TOGAF) http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/togaf8-doc/arch/chap28.html 
26 We note that the notion of a privacy design strategy should not be confused with the foundational principles 
of Cavoukian [57] or the concept of a privacy principle from the ISO 29100 Privacy framework [122].  
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Strategy #1: MINIMISE  
The most basic privacy design strategy is MINIMISE, which states that the amount of personal data 
that is processed27 should be restricted to the minimal amount possible.  
This  strategy  is  extensively  discussed  by  Gürses  et  al.  [111]. By ensuring that no, or no unnecessary, 
data is collected, the possible privacy impact of a system is limited. Applying the MINIMISE strategy 
means one has to answer whether the processing of personal data is proportional (with respect to the 
purpose) and whether no other, less invasive, means exist to achieve the same purpose. The decision 
to collect personal data can be made at design time and at run time, and can take various forms. For 
example, one can decide not to collect any information about a particular data subject at all. Alterna-
tively, one can decide to collect only a limited set of attributes.  
Design patterns 
Common design patterns that implement this strategy are ‘select before you collect’ [126], ‘anony-
misation and use pseudonyms’ [157].  
Strategy #2: HIDE  
The second design strategy, HIDE, states that any personal data, and their interrelationships, should 
be hidden from plain view. The rationale behind this strategy is that by hiding personal data from plain 
view, it cannot easily be abused. The strategy does not directly say from whom the data should be 
hidden. And this depends on the specific context in which this strategy is applied. In certain cases, 
where the strategy is used to hide information that spontaneously emerges from the use of a system 
(communication patterns for example), the intent is to hide the information from anybody. In other 
cases, where information is collected, stored or processed legitimately by one party, the intent is to 
hide the information from any other party. In this case, the strategy corresponds to ensuring confi-
dentiality.  
The HIDE strategy is important, and often overlooked. In the past, many systems have been designed 
using innocuous identifiers that later turned out to be privacy nightmares. Examples are identifiers on 
RFID tags, wireless network identifiers, and even IP addresses. The HIDE strategy forces one to rethink 
the use of such identifiers. In essence, the HIDE strategy aims to achieve unlinkability and unobserva-
bility [157]. Unlinkability in this context ensures that two events cannot be related to one another 
(where events can be understood to include data subjects doing something, as well as data items that 
occur as the result of an event).  
Design patterns 
The design patterns that belong to the HIDE strategy are a mixed bag. One of them is the use of en-
cryption of data (when stored, or when in transit). Other examples are mix networks [57] to hide traffic 
patterns [57], or techniques to unlink certain related events like attribute based credentials [49], anon-
ymisation and the use of pseudonyms. Techniques for computations on private data implement the 
HIDE strategy while allowing some processing. Note that the latter two patterns also belong to the 
MINIMISE strategy.  
Strategy #3: SEPARATE  
The third design strategy, SEPARATE, states that personal data should be processed in a distributed 
fashion, in separate compartments whenever possible.  
                                                          
27 For brevity, and in line with Article 2 of the European directive [83], we use data processing to include the 
collection, storage and dissemination of that data as well. 
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By separating the processing or storage of several sources of personal data that belong to the same 
person, complete profiles of one person cannot be made. Moreover, separation is a good method to 
achieve purpose limitation. The strategy of separation calls for distributed processing instead of cen-
tralised solutions. In particular, data from separate sources should be stored in separate databases, 
and these databases should not be linked. Data should be processed locally whenever possible, and 
stored locally if feasible as well. Database tables should be split when possible. Rows in these tables 
should be hard to link to each other, for example by removing any identifiers, or using table specific 
pseudonyms.  
These days, with an emphasis on centralised web based services this strategy is often disregarded. 
However, the privacy guarantees offered by peer-to-peer networks are considerable. Decentralised 
social networks like Diaspora28 are inherently more privacy-friendly than centralised approaches like 
Facebook and Google+.  
Design patterns  
No specific design patterns for this strategy are known.  
Strategy #4: AGGREGATE  
The fourth design pattern, AGGREGATE, states that Personal data should be processed at the highest 
level of aggregation and with the least possible detail in which it is (still) useful.  
Aggregation of information over groups of attributes or groups of individuals, restricts the amount of 
detail in the personal data that remains. This data therefore becomes less sensitive if the information 
is sufficiently coarse grained, and the size of the group over which it is aggregated is sufficiently large. 
Here coarse grained data means that the data items are general enough that the information stored 
is valid for many individuals hence little information can be attributed to a single person, thus protect-
ing its privacy.  
Design patterns 
Examples of design patterns that belong to this strategy are the following: aggregation over time (used 
in smart metering), dynamic location granularity (used in location based services), k-anonymity [185], 
differential privacy [93] and other anonymization techniques.  
3.2.2 Process oriented strategies  
Strategy #5: INFORM  
The INFORM strategy corresponds to the important notion of transparency (see also the transparency 
protection goal in Section 2.1 as well as the principle  “transparency  and  openness”  in  Section  2.2). 
Data subjects should be adequately informed whenever personal data is processed.  
Whenever data subjects use a system, they should be informed about which information is processed, 
for what purpose, and by which means. This includes information about the ways the information is 
protected, and being transparent about the security of the system. Providing access to clear design 
documentation is also a good practice. Data subjects should also be informed about third parties with 
which information is shared. And data subjects should be informed about their data access rights and 
how to exercise them.  
                                                          
28 http://diasporafoundation.org/  
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Design patterns 
A possible design patterns in this category is the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)29. Data breach 
notifications are also a design pattern in this category. Finally, Graf et al. [110] provide an interesting 
collection of privacy design patterns for informing the user from the Human Computer Interfacing 
perspective. More transparency-enhancing techniques are being mentioned in Section 4.11. 
Strategy #6: CONTROL  
The control strategy states that data subjects should be provided agency over the processing of their 
personal data (see  also  the  privacy  protection  goal  “intervenability”  introduced  in  Section 2.1 as well 
as the principle of supporting the rights of the individual (Section 2.2).  
The CONTROL strategy is in fact an important counterpart to the INFORM strategy. Without reasona-
ble  means  of  controlling  the  use  of  one’s  personal  data,  there  is  little use in informing a data subject 
about the fact that personal data is collected. Of course the converse also holds: without proper in-
formation, there is little use in asking consent. Data protection legislation often gives the data subject 
the right to view, update and even ask the deletion of personal data collected about her. This strategy 
underlines this fact, and design patterns in this class give users the tools to exert their data protection 
rights.  
CONTROL goes beyond the strict implementation of data protection rights, however. It also governs 
the means by which users can decide whether to use a certain system, and the way they control what 
kind of information is processed about them. In the context of social networks, for example, the ease 
with which the user can update his privacy settings through the user interface determines the level of 
control to a large extent. So user interaction design is an important factor as well. Moreover, by provid-
ing users direct control over their own personal data, they are more likely to correct errors. As a result 
the quality of personal data that is processed may increase.  
Design patterns  
User centric identity management and end-to-end encryption support control. Furthermore, we refer 
to Section 4.12 where tools are suggested when discussing intervenability. 
Strategy #7: ENFORCE  
The seventh strategy, ENFORCE, states: A privacy policy compatible with legal requirements should be 
in place and should be enforced. This relates to the accountability principle (see Section 2.2). 
The ENFORCE strategy ensures that a privacy policy is in place. This is an important step in ensuring 
that a system respects privacy during its operation. Of course the actual level of privacy protection 
depends on the actual policy. At the very least it should be compatible with legal requirements. As a 
result, purpose limitation is covered by this strategy as well. More importantly though, the policy 
should be enforced. This implies, at the very least, that proper technical protection mechanisms are 
in place that prevent violations of the privacy policy. Moreover, appropriate governance structures to 
enforce that policy must also be established.  
Design patterns  
Access control is an example of a design patterns that implement this strategy. Another example are 
sticky policies and privacy rights management: a form of digital rights management involving licenses 
to personal data.  
                                                          
29 http://www.w3.org/P3P/ 
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Strategy #8: DEMONSTRATE  
The final strategy, DEMONSTRATE, requires a data controller to be able to demonstrate compliance 
with the privacy policy and any applicable legal requirements. This strategy supports the accountabil-
ity principles of Section 2.2. 
This strategy goes one step further than the ENFORCE strategy in that it requires the data controller 
to prove that it is in control. This is explicitly required in the new draft EU privacy regulation [159]. In 
particular this requires the data controller to be able to show how the privacy policy is effectively 
implemented within the IT system. In case of complaints or problems, she should immediately be able 
to determine the extent of any possible privacy breaches.  
Design patterns 
Design patterns that implement this strategy are, for example, privacy management systems [50], and 
the use of logging and auditing.  
4 Privacy Techniques  
4.1 Authentication  
4.1.1 Privacy features of authentication protocols  
User authentication is the process by which users in a computer system are securely linked to princi-
pals that may access confidential information or execute privileged actions. Once this link is securely 
established communications can proceed on the basis that parties know each  other’s identity and a 
security policy can be implemented. Authentication is key to securing computer systems and is usually 
the very first step in using a remote service or facility, and performing access control. Strong authen-
tication may also be a key privacy mechanism when used to ensure that only a data subject, or au-
thorised parties, may access private information.  
While users may wish to identify themselves, serious privacy concerns could arise from the specific 
ways in which such authentication is performed. One privacy threat is that a passive network observer, 
in case of a network authentication protocol, is able to observe users’ authentication sessions in order 
to identify or track them. Another risk, is that the user attempts to authenticate to the wrong service 
controlled by a malicious entity, and as a result leaks their identity to them (and possibly also their 
credentials,  in  so  called  “phishing  attacks”  [78]). Finally, successful authentication may lead to a ses-
sion being established and maintained between two end points. However, a passive observer may 
again, through intercepting traffic, use the session meta-data to infer the identities of the communi-
cating parties.  
State-of-the-art authentication protocols provide protections against attacks outlined above. In par-
ticular they prevent third parties from inferring the identities of authenticating parties, do not leak 
those identities through impersonation, and cannot infer the identity of parties in a secure session.  
An example authentication protocol with state-of-the art privacy features is Just Fast Keying (JFK) [7] 
that builds on ISO 9798-3. The JFK protocol comes in two variants, JFKi providing initiator privacy, and 
JFKr providing responder privacy. Upon completion both protocols provide communicating parties as-
surance that they are talking to the claimed entity through the use of certificates and public key cryp-
tography. They also derive a fresh session key to protect the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality 
of further messages. All variants of JFK have been designed to resist resource depletion attacks and 
provide forward secrecy (a privacy property we discuss in Section 4.3.3).  
Privacy and Data Protection by Design  
– from policy to engineering 
 
December 2014  
  
 
Page  23 
The specific privacy features of the protocol are characteristic of the state of the art. Both JFKi/r vari-
ants provide privacy with respect to third party passive adversaries. This means that a third party ob-
serving a successful or unsuccessful authentication session is unable to infer the identities of either 
the initiator of the authentication session, or the responder. As a result it is possible for two parties 
to bootstrap an authenticated relationship without any passive eavesdroppers being able to infer their 
identities. The two variants of the JFK protocol extend this property to active adversaries: JFKi protects 
the identity of the initiator of the authentication session, and JFKr protects the identity of the re-
sponder. This means that the initiator and responder respectively are not uncovered even if an adver-
sary actively tries to mislead them by initiating or responding with fake messages.  
A weaker form of privacy-friendly authentication is common for web-services, and is based on a 
username and password being disclosed to a service though an encrypted connection [37] (e.g. using 
the   TLS   protocol).   This  mechanism’s   advantage   is   its   use   of   standard  web   technologies,   including  
HTTPS and web forms. It also hides the identity of the client authenticating themselves. However, it 
does not by default hide the identity of the server, even from a passive observer; a confused user 
subject to a phishing attack may disclose their identity and credentials (phishing attack); and, in some 
cases the remaining of the session reverts to unencrypted HTTP, leaking both the identity of the au-
thenticated user and cookies that may be used to impersonate them. As such, this mechanism should 
be used with great care, and recommend all authenticated interactions be encrypted. 
Authentication protocols providing privacy against passive third parties for both initiator and re-
sponder, and privacy for one of them in case of an active adversary should be considered the current 
state-of-the-art. In some circumstances protecting the identity of both initiator and responder against 
active adversaries is necessary. Protocols achieving this property are known as secret handshake pro-
tocols [191], since both parties attempt to hide their identity from the other until they are convinced 
of parts of the identity of the other—a technically expensive property to achieve. Practical secret 
handshake protocols have been proposed that allow users to successfully authenticate if both are part 
of a certain group (sharing a key), that otherwise do not learn any information about the identity of 
the users or their group membership [53]. Extensions that allow users to privately authenticate in 
groups have also been proposed.  
4.1.2 The benefits of end-to-end authentication  
The ability to authenticate users is key to providing strong forms of privacy protection for the contents 
of communications. Public key cryptography may be used to bootstrap a private session key between 
two parties from public keys that are authenticated as belonging to the two parties. However, the 
quality and degree of evidence available to users may be variable, depending on the protocols and 
architectures used. Two key paradigms have emerged:  
• Client-server authentication ensures a server, or in general a third party, is assured that the 
user connected to it is who they claim to be. As a result users are traditionally assigned an 
identifier (e.g. username) and others using the service can identify them through this identi-
fier. This is, for example, the established architecture for the federated chat protocols XMPP 
[176], where users authenticate to their XMPP server, which then attests their identity.  
• End-to-end authentication, in contrast, allows user to verify the identity claimed by other us-
ers directly, without reference to a common trusted third party. For example, user software 
may run an authentication protocol end-to-end, to verify the identity claims of other users, 
and subsequently protect the authenticity or other properties of the communications crypto-
graphically. Mutual authentication may be based on users initially sharing a short secret [32]; 
or they it rely on users verifying each other’s public keys directly or indirectly [4].  
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The advantage of the end-to-end authentication approach is that it allows secure channels to be boot-
strapped between users, and those channels are not subject to compromise by the trusted third party 
server in the first architecture (see Section 4.3.2 on channel security). Thus state of the art services 
should provide means, or at least support users that wish to authenticate others in an end-to end 
fashion.  
4.1.3 Privacy in federated identity management and single-sign-on  
Federated identity management systems separate entities that enrol users, and are able to identify 
them, from entities that rely on the result of the authentication process. In such systems a user may 
be registered as a user of a service A with a certain identity, and authenticate using this identity to a 
third party service B. In fact service B may allow authentication using any number of services, and 
accept the identities provided by those services.  
A number of widely deployed single-sign-on (SSO) services are provided by major internet companies, 
with varying privacy properties. One federated identity management single-sign-on system with ad-
vanced privacy features is Shibboleth30 used by a network of major United States educational institu-
tions. Shibboleth is designed to allow users to provide only the necessary subset of their attributes to 
a service provider after successful authentication. Even the user-id is considered to be an attribute 
that may or may not be released depending on whether a service absolutely needs to uniquely identify 
users. Some use cases, e.g. an on-line library providing material to members of the university, may not 
need to know the exact user but merely their university membership status. This embeds and supports 
the data protection minimisation principle.  
The policy implemented by Shibboleth, allowing selective disclosure of attributes, including partial 
anonymity, should be considered state of the art for federated identity systems. A number of similar 
designs such as InfoCards [9] and the Liberty Alliance protocols [10] have been proposed offering sim-
ilar privacy protections, attesting to the maturity of those techniques. However, it is important to note 
that the privacy protections offered by all these protocols are only robust against the third party ser-
vice observations. An eavesdropper looking at user traffic may be able to infer who users are, and 
their attributes; similarly the identity provider is made aware of every authentication session a user 
partakes in and the services they are accessing. Protocols with entities (including identity providers) 
that are able to observe the details of all authentication sessions of users should generally be avoided 
on the grounds they may be used or abused for pervasive monitoring. In Section 4.2 we discuss mod-
ern cryptographic mechanisms, namely selective disclosure credentials, allowing for selective revela-
tion of attributes that is robust against such threats. Where possible, adopting techniques shielding 
users from network observers as well as their identity providers should be preferred.  
4.2 Attribute based credentials  
Attribute based credentials31 are a fundamentally different technique to implement identity manage-
ment, compared to the more traditional forms of federated identity management that are described 
in section 4.1.3  
In federated (or network based) identity management, information about the identity of a user ac-
cessing a service is always obtained through an online identity provider (IdP). When accessing the 
service the user is redirected to this identity provider. Only after the user successfully logs in to this 
                                                          
30 http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/eqm0442.pdf 37 
31 Attribute based credentials have historically been called anonymous credentials. This term is no longer used 
as credentials can contain both identifying and non-identifying attributes. If they contain identifying attributes, 
they are by definition not anonymous. 
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identity provider, this IdP relays the requested information about the user back to the service pro-
vider. This makes the IdP the spider in the web for all identity-related transaction, which leads to 
several security, privacy and usability concerns [8]. For example, the identity provider can log all ser-
vice providers the user does business with while the service provider may obtain more personal infor-
mation than strictly necessary for offering the service. If the information requested by the service 
provider is used to grant access to a valuable resource (say, for example, your health records or finan-
cial administration), then the identity provider effectively has the keys to this information: it can ac-
cess this information without your consent or knowledge.  
Attribute based credentials (ABC) on the other hand put the user central to all transactions related to 
its identity.  
4.2.1 Principles  
Central to ABCs is the concept of an attribute. An attribute is any property that describes some aspect 
about a natural person32. The following items are examples of attributes: your name, age, date of 
birth, colour of hair, diplomas, grades, subscriptions, event tickets, to name but a few. Some attributes 
are static (like date of birth), others are dynamic (like a subscription to a newspaper). Some are iden-
tifying (your name) while others are not (your age, if the anonymity set is large enough).  
Attribute based credentials allow a user (in this context called a prover) to securely and privately prove 
ownership of an attribute to a service provider (in this context called a verifier). This is why attributes 
are stored in a secure container called a credential. Conceptually a credential is very similar to a cer-
tificate. A credential is issued (and signed) by a credential issuer that is trusted to provide valid values 
for the attributes in the credential. For example, the government is a trusted source for your age and 
nationality, whereas the bank is a trusted source for your credit score and your high school a trusted 
source for your graders and diplomas. Credentials typically also contain an expiration date, and are 
linked to the private key of the prover. This prevents credentials from being used by others.  
Credentials are fundamentally different from certificates in that they are never shown to other parties 
as is, as this would make the prover traceable. In fact, attribute based credential systems implement 
a so called selective disclosure protocol that allow the prover to select a subset of the attributes in a 
credential to be disclosed to the prover. The other attributes remain hidden. Certain schemes even 
allow the prover to only disclose the value of a function f(a1,...,an) over some attributes a1,...,an. Given 
your name, date of birth and place of birth, this allows you to prove you are over 18, without revealing 
anything more. Note that in general a prover may choose to reveal attributes that are in different 
credentials.  
4.2.2 Properties  
Attribute based credentials must satisfy the following properties (cf. [59, 49]). 
Unforgeability. Only issuers can create valid credentials. The attributes contained within a credential 
cannot be forged. A selective disclosure can only involve attributes from valid (unrevoked, see below) 
credentials.  
Unlinkability. Whenever a credential is used, no-one (except the prover or the inspector, see below) 
can link this to the case when this credential was issued. Moreover, whenever a credential is used, no-
one (except the prover or the inspector) can link this credential to a case where it was used before. 
This implies that the issuer cannot determine where you use your credentials. Moreover, even if you 
                                                          
32 Strictly speaking ABCs can also be used to describe properties of arbitrary entities, but we will not consider 
this for the purpose of this exposition. 
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use the same credential a hundred times at the same service provider, the service provider is com-
pletely unaware of this fact: as far as he is concerned he has served a hundred different customers. 
Note that revoked credentials (see below) are linkable by definition.  
Non-transferability. A credential issued to one prover cannot be used by another prover to prove 
possession of certain attributes. In particular, a single prover cannot try to combine several credentials 
that belong to different persons in a single selective disclosure. In other words users cannot collude 
and pool credentials to prove ownership of a combination of attributes not all owned by a single one 
of them.  
Revocability. Credentials can be revoked. Once a credential is revoked, no verifier will accept disclosed 
attributes that involve this credential. (If a single credential is revoked, use of that credential is there-
fore linkable.)  
Identity escrow and black listing. A trusted inspector has the power to retrieve the identity of the 
prover, when given a full trace of a selective disclosure between this prover and a verifier. Alterna-
tively, a misbehaving user can be blacklisted in an anonymous way, cf [188] 
The unlinkability property sets credentials apart from certificates. We note that not all systems imple-
ment identity escrow. Finally, revocation is actually hard to implement efficiently because it badly 
interacts with the unlinkability requirement. We refer to Lapon et al. [136] for a survey.  
4.2.3 Basic techniques  
Fundamentally, there are two basic strategies to implement unlinkability for attribute based creden-
tials.  
The first strategy requires provers to use credentials only once. Provers must request a fresh creden-
tial with the same set of attributes from the issuer each time they want to disclose an attribute from 
it. (Provers are allowed to cache credentials and request a batch of them whenever they are online.) 
This trivially implements unlinkability between multiple selective disclosures. Unlinkability of a cre-
dential between its issuing and the later disclosing of attributes in it is achieved by a blind signature 
protocol [58] that hides the actual credential from the issuer. U-Prove [42], one of the main attribute 
based credential schemes currently owned by Microsoft, is based on this principle. The main ad-
vantage of this scheme is that it allows efficient implementations. The main disadvantage is that prov-
ers need to be online and obtain fresh credentials all the time. Another state of the art protocol to 
issue such credentials is by Baldimtsi-Lysyanskaya [24]. 
The alternative strategy allows a prover to use a credential multiple times. In this case the prover must 
hide the actual credential from the user to prevent linkability. For this the powerful concept of a zero-
knowledge proof is used. Very roughly speaking, zero knowledge proofs allow you to prove possession 
of a secret without actually revealing it. Moreover, the verifier of such a proof cannot convince any-
body else of this fact. (Hence a traditional challenge response protocol is not zero knowledge.) Idemix 
[49], the other main attribute based credential scheme owned by IBM, is based on this principle. In 
Idemix, provers prove in zero knowledge that they own credentials, signed by the issuers, that contain 
the disclosed attributes. The advantages and disadvantages are exactly opposite to those of U-Prove: 
Idemix is more complex and thus has less efficient implementations. However, provers can be offline 
and use credentials multiple times without becoming linkable.  
We do note however that recent research [202] has shown that efficient implementations of Idemix, 
that allow it to be used even on a smart card, are possible33.  
                                                          
33 http://www.irmacard.org  
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An efficient implementation of a multiple-show attribute based credential scheme does not really ex-
ist yet. However, it is to expect that in the near future hardware support for pairings becomes availa-
ble. Furthermore, a promising (but so far only theoretical) approach appears to be the use of self-
blindable credentials [198, 28]. Instead of proving ownership of a credential using a zero-knowledge 
protocol, provers randomise (in other words blind) the credential themselves before sending it to the 
verifier. This randomisation prevents linkability. Of course the randomisation procedure must main-
tain the values of the attributes and the possibility for the verifier to verify the issuer signature on it34  
4.3 Secure private communications  
Most physical network links provide poor guarantees of confidentiality and privacy. Local networks 
are increasingly wireless, and wide area networks are impossible to physically secure against pervasive 
surveillance. Therefore, any information from a user to a service or between users should preferably 
be encrypted using modern cryptographic techniques to render it unintelligible to eavesdroppers. All 
types of communications from the user should be protected: personal information or sensitive user 
input should be encrypted to preserve its privacy (and security); however, even accesses to otherwise 
public resources should be obscured through encryption to prevent an eavesdropper from inferring 
users’  patterns  of  browsing, profiling, service use [97] or extracting identifiers that may be used for 
future tracking.  
4.3.1 Basic Encryption: client-service  
Deployed cryptographic channels provide a high degree of confidentiality for communications be-
tween clients and services when implemented and configured correctly. Widely deployed technolo-
gies include the latest Transport Layer Security 1.2 (TLS1.2) [79], as well as the Secure Shell (SSH) pro-
tocols [25]. Those technologies provide a confidential, and possibly authenticated channel between 
clients and end-services.  
Both  TLS  and  SSH  use  “public  key  cryptography”  technologies  that  allow  for  encrypted  channels  to  be  
set up without clients and servers sharing any prior secrets. However, TLS1.2 does rely on a public key 
certificate infrastructure of certificate authorities that is necessary to ensure the authenticity of the 
server end of the encrypted tunnels. Conversely, compromised authorities may lead to the security of 
channels being compromised. For public resources, accessible through web-browsers, a valid public 
key certificate is necessary and should be obtained. In case TLS is used within custom built software 
or mobile application, certificate pinning techniques may be used to avoid the need for a certificate 
from a globally trusted authority (Certificate Pinning [96]). Such a model should be preferred for in-
ternal channels such as those used by application for software updates. SSH relies on manual user 
verification of the service key, which is more taxing on non-technical users. Such a model should only 
be deployed after user studies confirm users are capable of performing checks consistently and cor-
rectly.  
Deploying TLS 1.2, or an equivalent secure channel, for every network interaction should be consid-
ered the current state of the-art. Detailed guidance about the currently recommended ciphersuites 
for both families of protocols is provided in the ENISA report on ciphers and key lengths[180].  
A number of technologies may be used for communication within an organisation to protect user data 
in transit over networks. One such example is IPSec [92] that creates secure communication tunnels 
                                                          
34 This discussion sidesteps the issue of selectively disclosing attributes in a credential. Moreover, one can argue 
that Idemix is also based on the self-blinding principle as it randomises the signature on the credential before 
sending it to the verifier. Idemix can however not randomise all parts of the signature and hence needs to prove 
(in zero-knowledge) possession of an import component of that signature. 
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between networked machines, or between networks connected by public network links. It is recom-
mended that traffic internal to an organisation (local-area network) is encrypted if it may contain user 
information, such as for performing back-ups or communications between application and database 
servers. Links over wide area networks, be it public or private (lease fiber / line) should always be 
encrypted due to the difficulty of guaranteeing the physical security of those channels. A number of 
mature Virtual Private Network (VPN) technologies and products are commercially available to protect 
such links.  
4.3.2 Basic Encryption: end-to-end  
A number of services, such as Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP), electronic mail or instant messag-
ing and social networking mediate communications between end users. Such services should prefer 
to encrypt the communications between users in an end-to-end fashion, meaning the encryption is 
added at one user end-point and is only stripped at the other end-user end-point, making the content 
of communications unintelligible to any third parties including the service providers. While the service 
providers may wish to assist users in authenticating themselves to each other for the purpose of es-
tablishing such an end-to-end encrypted channel, it is preferable, from a privacy perspective, that the 
keys used to subsequently protect the confidentiality and integrity of data never be available to the 
service providers, but derived on the end-user devices.  
A number of services may require some visibility into the contents of communications for either rout-
ing them to the correct destination, or providing value added services. In such cases the minimum 
amount of information should be exposed to the provider, and to the extent possible any manipula-
tion of the content of communication should be performed on user devices and minimising the con-
tent leaked to the service providers.  
A number of technologies have been proposed, implemented and standardised to different extents 
to provide end-to-end confidentiality. The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [210] software as well as S/MIME 
standards [161] may be used to protect email correspondences end-to-end; the Off-The-Record mes-
saging (OTR) [38] protocols are widely supported by clients software to protect instant messaging 
conversations. Mobile applications such as Whisper   Systems’   TextSecure provide end-to-end en-
crypted mobile chat; Crypto Phone and Red Phone provide end-to-end encrypted communications. As 
such the technology for providing end-to-end communications is mature, and provision of this prop-
erty should be considered the state of the art.  
4.3.3 Key rotation, forward secrecy and coercion resistance  
Modern encryption technologies provide strong confidentiality guarantees, but only against eaves-
droppers that are not able to get access to the secrets keys used to protect them. Those short binary 
strings therefore become valuable targets for theft, extortion, compromise through hacking or coer-
cion.  
To minimise the potential for keys to be compromised it is important to rotate keys regularly, there-
fore minimising the exposure of private data in case of a key compromise. Modern cryptographic sys-
tems, including some configurations of TLS (using the DH or ECDH cipher suites) and all configurations 
of OTR, provide forward secrecy, a property that guarantees the use of fresh keys for each communi-
cation session and discarding of key upon session termination. Forward secrecy guarantees that after 
a communication session is over, the secret key material cannot be recovered, and therefore no 
amount of coercion can render the encrypted material intelligible. The provision of such automatic 
key rotation schemes should be considered.  
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The state of the art is for no long-term secrets to be used to protect the confidentiality of interactive 
end-to-end conversations. For asynchronous communications (such as email) regular key rotation 
should be enforced and automatically managed by state-of-the-art services and applications.  
4.4 Communications anonymity and pseudonymity  
End-to-end encryption may be used to protect the content of communications, but leaves meta-data 
exposed to third-parties. Meta-data is information  “about”  the  communication,  such  as  who  is  talking 
to whom, the time and volume of messages, the duration of sessions or calls, the location and possibly 
identity of the network end-points.  
The exposure of meta-data may have a devastating impact on privacy. Uncovering the fact that a jour-
nalist is talking to someone within an organisation or government department may compromise them 
as a journalistic source, even if the details of the message contents are not recoverable. Similarly, 
observing someone persistently browsing for information on some form of cancer may be indicative 
of a health concern or condition. Meta-data may also uncover lifestyle information that is not imme-
diately obvious to communicating parties. For example persistent collocation of two mobile devices 
at out of office hours and on weekends is indicative of a close personal relationship. Meta-data anal-
ysis of mobile phone location logs, or WiFi / IP addresses, can uncover those relations even when the 
individuals concerned have not exchanged any messages.  
4.4.1 Properties of anonymous communications  
The family of privacy systems that obscure communications meta-data are known under the umbrella 
term  “anonymous  communications”  [61]35. However, those systems may provide a number of subtle 
privacy properties besides straight-forward anonymity. A system provides sender anonymity or initi-
ator anonymity if it hides who sent a message, or initiated a network connection. Conversely, a system 
provides recipient anonymity if it is possible to contact the individual or service, without learning its 
physical or network location. The first property allows users to access services anonymously. The latter 
property is useful to run services without exposing the meta-data of the host or operators.  
Recipient and initiator anonymity properties ensure that identifying information is hidden from both 
third parties, and their communication partners. A weaker, but very useful property, is third-party 
anonymity that ensures meta-data is not revealed to third parties, while both partners know, with 
high certainty,  each  other’s identities. Third-party anonymity is closest to traditional secure channels, 
and simply augments the protection they provide by hiding meta-data. Variants of third-party ano-
nymity include a number of pseudonymous communication channels: such systems hide the identity 
of either the initiator or responder, but assign to users a stable pseudonym that can be used to fight 
spam or abuse. It is important to note that long-term pseudonyms run the risk of becoming as reveal-
ing as real identities, as users perform linkable actions and leak an increasing amount of identifying or 
personal information over time. It is therefore good practice to allow users to refresh their pseudo-
nyms or have control of more than one at a time.  
Finally, specialised anonymous communications systems may require a high degree of robustness and 
strong guarantees that all messages are relayed correctly, without genuine messages dropped or ad-
versary messages being injected. Such systems are used to provide anonymity for ballots of crypto-
graphically protected elections, where dropping or injecting ballots could be catastrophic [127]. They 
                                                          
35 Note  that  the  term  “anonymous”  in  European  law  usually  means  that  re-identification is not possible (at least 
not with proportionate effort) while the technological research typically refers to anonymity within a defined 
(or to be defined) anonymity set [150]. 
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thus have to provide cryptographic proofs of correct anonymisations and operation—these proofs are 
expected to be publicly verifiable.  
4.4.2 Threat models  
Like any security system anonymous communications techniques provide properties subject to a 
threat model—i.e. a set of capabilities available to the adversary. Systems have been designed to pro-
tect users from adversaries able to observe parts of the network (partial adversary) or the whole net-
work (global passive adversary). Since anonymous channels rely on open services to provide their pro-
tections one may assume that some of those services are also controlled by the adversary. Finally, the 
adversary may not only be able to observe the network or some services, but also tamper with the 
communications they handle to inject, delay, modify or drop messages (active adversary). When de-
ploying anonymity system it is important to always evaluate whether the protections they provide 
withstand a sufficiently strong adversary for the purposes they are fielded.  
4.4.3 Families of anonymous communications  
As a basic principle one cannot hide their identity by themselves, so all systems providing anonymity 
properties attempt to conflate messages from multiple users in a way that is difficult to disentangle 
for the adversary. As a result anonymous communications systems benefit from large volumes of us-
ers, a phenomenon known as “anonymity loves company” [80]. As a result there might be benefits in 
a number of organisations running such systems collaboratively increasing the privacy of all their us-
ers.  
Single Proxies & VPNs. The simplest means to achieve some degree of anonymity is to use a “proxies”.  
Those proxies may take the form of open SMTP relays for e-mail, or open SOCKs proxies for generic 
TCP streams. However, anyone observing the traffic around the proxy can deduce the identity of those 
communicating. A slightly more robust mechanism involves the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
that are commercially available. Such services encrypt all traffic from the user to a gateway, and then 
allow it to exit to the open internet through a single (or few) points. Thus an adversary observing the 
client cannot simply deduce the destination of the traffic. However, a global passive adversary may be 
able to trace communications if their timing and volumes are not carefully hidden (which is uncommon 
due to costs).  
Onion Routing. Single relays depend on a single operator that may be observed or coerced by an 
adversary to reveal the identities of communicating parties. The onion routing [108] family of schemes 
alleviates this by relying on multiple relays that possibly carry communications. As a result an adver-
sary would have to control a much larger number of relays, or coerce a number of them to effectively 
track activities. The currently popular Tor service [81] has over 5000 such relays and serves over 1 
million users per day. The Jondonym service36 similarly operates a number of cascades of relays (alt-
hough a smaller number) and provides a commercial service. Despite the increased difficulty, a global 
passive adversary may still be able to infer who is talking to whom through statistical analysis.  
Mix-networks. Mix networks [61], in addition to using multiple relays restrict the size of messages to 
a uniform quantum, and are engineered to allow for long delays and cover traffic to mask statistical 
leaks that could trace messages. Such operational systems include mixmaster [146], and experimental 
systems providing support for replies have also been engineered and operated, such as mixminion 
[73]. The increase in latency over onion routing and the lack of bi-directional communications restricts 
their appeal, drives the number of users down, and as a result they may provide a lesser degree of 
                                                          
36 https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/ 
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anonymity despite their stronger designs. Special mix-networks designed for electronic and crypto-
graphic elections are also available to anonymise ballots, while providing cryptographic proofs of cor-
rect operation. Such systems include the latest Verificatum37.  
Broadcast schemes. Finally, a simple but expensive method to achieve anonymity is broadcast with 
implicit addressing. Such schemes simply send all messages to everyone in a group without any des-
ignation of the recipient. Each receiver has to attempt to decode the message with their keys, to de-
termine if it is destined to them. These schemes, as well as the DC-net scheme for sending anony-
mously, become expensive as groups grow, since every actual message requires all members of a 
group to send or receive a message. If however a physical network layer allows for cheap broadcast 
they are very competitive [184].  
While some anonymous communications systems are now deployed, and their infrastructure is ma-
ture (as for Tor), they suffer from some fundamental limitations. Low-latency anonymity systems, such 
as onion routing, are not resistant to a network adversary that can observe traffic from the source and 
to the destination of a circuit [209]. Such an adversary is able, over a short time, to de-anonymise the 
connection. Higher latency anonymity systems may not suffer from such a short term attack, but suffer 
from long-term disclosure attacks [72], where an adversary can discover the long-term communica-
tion partners of senders and receivers. Their poor network performance makes them impractical for 
interactive application, and they struggle to support forward secure encryption mechanisms opening 
them to coercion attacks. Thus, anonymity properties supported by privacy-enhancing technologies, 
are inherently more costly and more fragile than equivalent secure channels and private authentica-
tion mechanisms. 
4.4.4 Steganography and blocking resistance  
In a number of settings other meta-data, besides the identity of conversing parties, needs to be pro-
tected  to  preserve  privacy  or  related  properties.  In  the  context  of  “anonymous  communications”  it  
may be necessary to masquerade the type of service used, to bypass restrictions on communications 
put  in  place  by  service  providers.  The  Tor  project  deploys  an  architecture  of  “Bridges”  and  “Pluggable  
Transports”  [15] that aim to hide traffic to this service by making it look like an innocuous encrypted 
service.  
The attempt to make Tor traffic look like other types of traffic is a specific application of a broad family 
of  “steganographic”  techniques  [130]. Steganography is the discipline of how to modulate messages 
to make them look like a cover, in such a way that the fact that a hidden, or encrypted, communication 
has taken place is not detectable. Conversely, steganalysis is the discipline of analysing cover messages 
trying to detect whether, or not, they may contain a steganographic hidden message.  
Some aspects of steganography are related to engineering privacy by design, as they can be used to 
implement coercion resistant properties. For example the disk encryption utility TrueCrypt [101] pro-
vides options for steganographic containers that allow users to encrypt files in a deniable manner. A 
mature research field exists on how to embed hidden messages in other media, such as images, audio 
or video, but few established products support such features for direct messaging by users.  
4.5 Privacy in databases  
The meaning of database privacy is largely dependent on the context where this concept is being used. 
In official statistics, it normally refers to the privacy of the respondents to which the database records 
correspond. In co-operative market analysis, it is understood as keeping private the databases owned 
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by the various collaborating corporations. In healthcare, both of the above requirements may be im-
plicit: patients must keep their privacy and the medical records should not be transferred from a hos-
pital to, say, an insurance company. In the context of interactively queryable databases and, in partic-
ular, Internet search engines, the most rapidly growing concern is the privacy of the queries submitted 
by users (especially after scandals like the August 2006 disclosure by the AOL38 search engine of 36 
million queries made by 657000 users). Thus, what makes the difference is whose privacy is being 
sought.  
The last remark motivates splitting database privacy in the following three dimensions:  
1. Respondent privacy is about preventing re-identification of the respondents (e.g. individ-
uals like patients or organisations like enterprises) to which the records of a database cor-
respond. Usually respondent privacy becomes an issue only when the database is to be 
made available by the data collector (hospital or national statistical office) to third parties, 
like researchers or the public at large.  
2. Owner privacy is about two or more autonomous entities being able to compute queries 
across their databases in such a way that only the results of the query are revealed.  
3. User privacy is about guaranteeing the privacy of queries to interactive databases, in order 
to prevent user profiling and re-identification.  
The technologies to deal with the above three privacy dimensions have evolved in a fairly independent 
way within research communities with surprisingly little interaction.  
4.6 Technologies for respondent privacy: statistical disclosure control  
Respondent privacy has been mainly pursued by statisticians and some computer scientists working 
in statistical disclosure control (SDC), also known as statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) or inference 
control. The seminal paper of SDC was written by Dalenius in 1974 [71]. A current state of the art can 
be found in the book [122].  
Two types of disclosure are addressed by SDC. On the one hand, attribute disclosure occurs when the 
value of a confidential attribute of an individual can be determined more accurately with access to the 
released data than without. On the other hand identity disclosure occurs when a record in the anon-
ymised  data  set  can  be  linked  with  a  respondent’s  identity.  In  general,  attribute  disclosure  does  not  
imply identity disclosure, and conversely.  
4.6.1 Tabular data protection  
There are several types of tables:  
• Frequency tables. They display the count of respondents (natural number) at the crossing of 
the categorical attributes. E.g. number of patients per disease and municipality.  
• Magnitude tables. They display information on a numerical attribute (real number) at the 
crossing of the categorical attributes. E.g. average age of patients per disease and municipal-
ity.  
• Linked tables. Two tables are linked if they share some of the crossed categorical attributes, 
e.g.  “Disease”  ×  “Town”  and  “Disease”  ×  “Gender”.   
Whatever the type of the table, marginal row and column totals must be preserved. Even if tables 
display aggregate information, disclosure can occur:  
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• External attack. E.g.,  let  a  released  frequency  table  “Ethnicity”  ×  “Town”  contain  a  single  re-­‐
spondent for ethnicity Ei and town Tj. Then if a magnitude table is released with the average 
blood pressure for each ethnicity and each town, the exact blood pressure of the only re-
spondent with ethnicity Ei in town Tj is publicly disclosed.  
• Internal attack. If there are only two respondents for ethnicity Ei and town Tj, the blood pres-
sure of each of them is disclosed to the other.  
• Dominance attack. If one (or few) respondents dominate in the contribution to a cell in a mag-
nitude table, the dominant respondent(s) can upper-bound the contributions of the rest. E.g. 
if the table displays the cumulative earnings for each job type and town, and one individual 
contributes 90% of a certain cell value, s/he knows her/his colleagues in the town are not 
doing very well.  
SDC principles for table protection can be classified as follows.  
• Non-perturbative. They do not modify the values in the cells, but they may suppress or recode 
them. Best known methods: cell suppression (CS), recoding of categorical attributes.  
• Perturbative. They modify the values in the cells. Best known methods: controlled rounding 
(CR) and the recent controlled tabular adjustment (CTA).  
Cell suppression. In this approach, sensitive cells are identified in a table, using a so-called sensitivity 
rule. Then the values of sensitive cells are suppressed (primary suppressions). After that, additional 
cells are suppressed (secondary suppressions) to prevent recovery of primary suppressions from row 
and/or column marginals. Examples of sensitivity rules for primary suppressions are:  
(n, k)-dominance. A cell is sensitive if n or fewer respondents contribute more than a fraction k of the 
cell value.  
pq-rule. If respondents’ contributions to the cell can be estimated within q percent before seeing the 
cell and within p percent after seeing the cell, the cell is sensitive.  
p%-rule. Special case of the pq-rule with q = 100.  
As to secondary suppressions, usually one attempts to minimise either the number of secondary sup-
pressions or their pooled magnitude (complex optimisation problems). Optimisation methods are 
heuristic, based on mixed linear integer programming or networks flows (the latter for 2-D tables 
only). Implementations are available in the τ-Argus package [123].  
Controlled rounding and controlled tabular adjustment. CR rounds values in the table to multiples of 
a rounding base (marginals may have to be rounded as well). CTA modifies the values in the table to 
prevent inference of sensitive cell values within a prescribed protection interval. CTA attempts to find 
the closest table to the original one that protects all sensitive cells. CTA optimisation is typically based 
on mixed linear integer programming and entails less information loss than CS.  
4.6.2 Queryable database protection  
There are two main SDC principles for queryable database protection:  
• Query perturbation. Perturbation (noise addition) can be applied to the microdata records on 
which queries are computed (input perturbation) or to the query result after computing it on 
the original data (output perturbation).  
• Query restriction. The database refuses to answer certain queries.  
Differential privacy for output perturbation. As defined in [93], a randomised query function F gives 
H-differential privacy if, for all data sets D1, D2 such that one can be obtained from the other by mod-
ifying a single record, and all S ⊂ Range(F), it holds that  
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Pr(F(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(H) × Pr(F(D2) ∈ S). 
Usually F(D) = f (D) + Y (D), where f (D) is a user query to a database D and Y (D) is a random noise 
(typically Laplace  with  zero  mean  and  ∆(  f  )/oH,  where  ∆(  f  )  is  the  sensitivity  of  f  and  H is a privacy 
parameter (the larger, the less privacy)). Hence, differential privacy follows the output perturbation 
principle.  
Query restriction. This is the right approach if the user does require deterministically correct answers 
and these answers have to be exact (i.e. a number). Exact answers may be very disclosive, so it may 
be necessary to refuse answering certain queries at some stage. A common criterion to decide 
whether a query can be answered is query set size control: the answer to a query is refused if this 
query together with the previously answered ones isolates too small a set of records. The main prob-
lem of query restriction are: i) the computational burden to keep track of previous queries; ii) collusion 
attacks can circumvent the query limit.  
Tracker attacks. Query set size control is justified by the existence of trackers, pointed out already in 
1979 by Denning et al. [76]. A tracker is a sequence of queries to an on-line statistical database whose 
answers disclose the attribute values for a small subgroup of individual target records or even a single 
record. In [77] it was shown that building a tracker is feasible and quick for any subgroup of target 
records.  
4.6.3 Microdata protection  
A microdata file X with s respondents and t attributes is an s × t matrix where Xij is the value of attribute 
j for respondent i. Attributes can be numerical (e.g. age, blood pressure) or categorical (e.g. gender, 
job). Depending on their disclosure potential, attributes can be classified as:  
• Identifiers. Attributes that unambiguously identify the respondent (e.g. passport no., social 
security no., name-surname, etc.).  
• Quasi-identifiers or key attributes. They identify the respondent with some ambiguity, but 
their combination may lead to unambiguous identification (e.g. address, gender, age, tele-
phone no., etc.).  
• Confidential outcome attributes. They contain sensitive respondent information (e.g. salary, 
religion, diagnosis, etc.).  
• Non-confidential outcome attributes. Other attributes which contain non-sensitive respond-
ent info.  
Identifiers are of course suppressed in anonymised data sets. Disclosure risk comes from quasi-iden-
tifiers (QIs), but these cannot be suppressed because they often have high analytical value. Indeed, 
QIs can be used to link anonymised records to external non-anonymous databases (with identifiers) 
that contain the same or similar QIs; this leads to re-identification. Hence, anonymisation procedures 
must deal with QIs.  
There are two principles used in microdata protection, data masking and data synthesis:  
• Masking  generates  a  modified  version  Xʹ′  of  the  original  microdata  set  X,  and  it  can  be  pertur-
bative masking (Xʹ′  of  the  original  microdata  set  X)  or  non-perturbative masking (Xʹ′  is  obtained  
from X by partial suppressions or reduction of detail, yet the data in  Xʹ′  are  still  true).   
• Synthesis  is  about  generating  synthetic  (i.e.  artificial)  data  Xʹ′  that  preserve  some  preselected  
properties of the original data X.  
Perturbative masking. There are several principles for perturbative masking:  
• Noise addition. This principle is only applicable to numerical microdata. The most popular 
method  consists  of  adding  to  each  record  in  the  data  set  a  noise  vector  drawn  from  a  N(0,αΣ),  
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with  Σ  being  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  original  data.  Means  and  correlations  of  original data 
can be preserved in the masked data by choosing  the  appropriate  α.  Additional linear trans-
formations of the masked data can be made to ensure that the sample covariance matrix of 
the  masked  attributes  is  an  unbiased  estimator  for  Σ.   
• Microaggregation. Microaggregation [87] partitions records in a data set into groups contain-
ing each at least k records; then the average record of each group is published. Groups are 
formed by the criterion of maximum within-group similarity: the more similar the records in 
a group, the less information loss is incurred when replacing them by the average record. 
There exist microaggregation methods for numerical and also categorical microdata.  
• Data swapping. Values of attributes are exchanged among individual records, so that low-
order frequency counts or marginals are maintained. Although swapping was proposed for 
categorical attributes, its rank swapping variant is also applicable to numerical attributes. In 
the latter, values of each attribute are ranked in ascending order and each value is swapped 
with another ranked value randomly chosen within a restricted range (e.g. the ranks of two 
swapped values cannot differ by more than p% of the total number of records).  
• Post-randomisation. The PRAM method [133] works on categorical attributes: each value of a 
confidential attribute is stochastically changed to a different value according to a prescribed 
Markov matrix.  
Differential privacy in noise-added data sets. H-differential privacy can also be viewed as a privacy 
requirement to be attained when adding noise to data sets (not just to query outputs). An oH-differ-
entially private data set can be created by pooling the oH-private answers to queries for the content 
of each individual record.  
Non-perturbative masking. Principles used for non-perturbative masking include:  
• Sampling. Instead of publishing the original data file, only a sample of it is published. A low 
sampling fraction may suffice to anonymise categorical data (probability that a sample unique 
is also a population unique is low). For continuous data, sampling alone does not suffice.  
• Generalisation. This principle is also known as coarsening or global recoding. For a categorical 
attribute, several categories are combined to form new (less specific) categories; for a numer-
ical attribute, numerical values are replaced by intervals (discretisation).  
• Top/bottom coding. Values above, resp. below, a certain threshold are lumped into a single 
top, resp. bottom, category.  
• Local suppression. Certain values of individual attributes are suppressed in order to increase 
the set of records agreeing on a combination of quasi-identifier attributes. This principle can 
be combined with generalisation.  
k-Anonymity, generalisation and microaggregation. As defined in [177], a data set is said to satisfy k-
anonymity if each combination of values of the quasi-identifier attributes in it is shared by at least k 
records. The principles originally proposed to attain k-anonymity were generalisation and local sup-
pression on the quasi-identifiers. Later, [90] showed that microaggregation on the projection of rec-
ords on their quasi-identifiers was also a valid approach.  
Synthetic microdata generation. Rubin [173] proposed this principle, which consists of randomly gen-
erating data in such a way that some statistics or relationships of the original data are preserved. The 
advantage of synthetic data is that no respondent re-identification seems possible, because data are 
artificial. There are downsides, too. If a synthetic record matches by chance  a  respondent’s  attributes,  
re-identification is likely and the respondent will find little comfort in the data being synthetic. Data 
utility of synthetic microdata is limited to the statistics and relationships pre-selected at the outset: 
analyses on random subdomains are no longer preserved. Partially synthetic or hybrid data are more 
flexible.  
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4.6.4 Evaluation of SDC methods  
Evaluation is in terms of two conflicting goals: 
• Minimise the data utility loss caused by the method.  
• Minimise the extant disclosure risk in the anonymised data.  
The best methods are those that optimise the trade-off between both goals.  
Evaluation of tabular SDC methods. For cell suppression, utility loss can be measured as the number 
or the pooled magnitude of secondary suppressions. For CTA or CR, it can be measured as the sum of 
distances between true and perturbed cells. The above loss measures can be weighted by cell costs, 
if not all cells have the same importance. As to disclosure risk, it is normally evaluated by computing 
feasibility intervals for the sensitive cells (via linear programming constrained by the marginals). The 
table is said to be safe if the feasibility interval for any sensitive cell contains the protection interval 
previously defined for that cell by the data protector.  
Evaluation of queryable database SDC methods. For query perturbation, the difference between the 
true query response and the perturbed query response is a measure of utility loss; this can be charac-
terised in terms of the mean and variance of the added noise (ideally the mean should be zero and 
the variance small). For query restriction, utility loss can be measured as the number of refused que-
ries. Regarding disclosure risk, if query perturbation satisfies epsilon-differential privacy, the disclo-
sure risk is proportional to parameter epsilon. 
Evaluation of micro data SDC methods. Utility loss can be evaluated using either data use-specific loss 
measures or generic loss measures. The former measure to what extent anonymisation affects the 
output of a particular analysis. Very often, the data protector has no clue as to what the users will do 
with the anonymised data; in this case, generic utility loss measures can be used that measure the 
impact of anonymisation on a collection of basic statistics (means, covariances, etc., see [89]) or that 
rely on some score (such as propensity scores [205]).  
To measure disclosure risk in micro data anonymisation, two approaches exist: a priori and a posteri-
ori. The a priori approach is based on some privacy model (H-differential privacy, k-anonymity, l-diver-
sity, t-closeness, etc.) that guarantees an upper bound on the disclosure risk by design. The a posteriori 
approach consists of running an anonymisation method and then measuring the risk of disclosure (e.g. 
by attempting record linkage between the original and the anonymised data sets, by using analytical 
risk measures adapted to the anonymisation method, etc.).  
4.6.5 Main privacy models used for a priori privacy guarantees  
We have mentioned above H-differential privacy [93] and k-anonymity [177]. A number of k-anonymity 
extensions exists to address the basic problem of k-anonymity: while it is able to prevent identity dis-
closure (a record in a k-anonymised data set cannot be mapped back to the corresponding record in 
the original data set) in general it may fail to protect against attribute disclosure. To illustrate this, 
consider a k-anonymised medical data set in which there is a k-anonymous group (a group of k patient 
records sharing the quasi-identifier values) whose records have the same (or very similar) values for 
the  confidential  attribute  “Disease”  (e.g.  “Disease”  is  AIDS  for  all  of  them).  In  this  case,  an  intruder  
that manages to determine that the anonymised record for her target individual belongs to that k-
anonymous group learns that the target individual suffers from AIDS (even if that individual is remains 
k-anonymous). k-Anonymity extensions include the following:  
• l-Diversity [142]. A k-anonymous data set is said to satisfy it if, for each group of records shar-
ing quasi-identifier values, there are at least l “well-represented”  values  for  each  confidential  
attribute.  
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• t-Closeness [139]. A k-anonymous data set is said to satisfy it if, for each group of records 
sharing quasi-identifier values, the distance between the distribution of each confidential at-
tribute within the group and the distribution of the attribute in the whole data set is no more 
than a threshold t.  
See [91] for a critical assessment of k-anonymity and the above extensions. In general, they provide 
less strict privacy guarantees than H-differential privacy, even if t-closeness with a suitable distance 
can yield H-differential privacy [182]. However, k-anonymity-like models usually entail less utility loss 
than H-differential privacy, which is attractive when one wishes to publish anonymised data sets to be 
used by researchers; see [65] for a comparison of both model families.  
4.6.6 Software for a priori and a posteriori anonymisation  
Regarding a priori anonymisation, software offering anonymisation with k-anonymity, l-diversity and 
t-closeness guarantees is freely available, e.g. ARX39.  
Also, a number of academic systems implement general purpose data processing systems with differ-
ential privacy guarantees. The Microsoft Research PINQ project40 defines queries in a LINQ-like syntax, 
executes them and protects the results using a differentially private mechanism. The Airavat system41 
uses the Sample-and-aggregate differentially private mechanism to protect map-reduce query results 
using differential privacy. Other systems include Fuzz (UPenn) and GUPT (Berkeley). 
In what respects a posteriori anonymisation, the official statistics community has produced the free 
software packages for microdata protection: P-ARGUS [124] and sdcMicro [186]. 
4.6.7 De-anonymisation attacks  
For datasets with low to moderate dimension (number of attributes), anonymisation methods can 
protect against re-identification based on crossing databases. For high-dimensional datasets, protec-
tion becomes much more difficult. In [149], a new class of statistical de-anonymisation attacks against 
high-dimensional data sets was presented and illustrated on the Netflix Prize data. This data set con-
tains anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers of Netflix and the attack showed that knowing 
a little bit about an individual subscriber is enough to find his record in the data set. In such high-
dimensional data sets, it is hard to split attributes between quasi-identifiers and confidential, so k-
anonymity-like methods are hardly usable. H-differential privacy could still be used to prevent re-iden-
tification, but at the cost of a huge utility loss.  
4.7 Technologies for owner privacy: privacy-preserving data mining  
Owner privacy is the primary though not the only goal of privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM). 
PPDM has become increasingly popular because it allows sharing sensitive data for analysis purposes. 
It consists of techniques for modifying the original data in such a way that the private data and/or 
knowledge (i.e. the rules) remain private even after the mining process [199]. PPDM may provide also 
respondent privacy as a by-product.  
PPDM based on random perturbation was introduced by [6] in the database community. This type of 
PPDM is largely based on statistical disclosure control (see Section 4.6 above). Independently and sim-
ultaneously, PPDM based on secure multiparty computation (MPC) was introduced by [140] in the 
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40 http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/pinq/ 
41 http://z.cs.utexas.edu/users/osa/airavat/ 
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cryptographic community. We next discuss some specifics of PPDM for data hiding and for knowledge 
hiding.  
4.7.1 PPDM for data hiding  
The approach can be oriented to countering attribute disclosure (protecting values of confidential 
attributes) or identity disclosure (protecting against re-identification).  
Random perturbation PPDM for data hiding uses the statistical disclosure control methods discussed 
in Section 4.6 above. Cryptographic PPDM for data hiding uses SMC for a wide range of clustering and 
other data mining algorithms in distributed environments, where the data are partitioned across mul-
tiple parties. Partitioning can be vertical (each party holds the projection of all records on a different 
subset of attributes), horizontal (each party holds a subset of the records, but each record contains all 
attributes) or mixed (each party holds a subset of the records projected on a different subset of at-
tributes). For example, a secure scalar product protocol based on cryptographic primitives is applied 
in privacy preserving k-means clustering over a vertically distributed dataset in [194].  
Using SMC protocols which are based on cryptography or sharing intermediate results often requires 
changing or adapting the data mining algorithms. Hence, each cryptographic PPDM protocol is de-
signed for a specific data mining computation and in general it is not valid for other computations. In 
contrast, random perturbation PPDM is more flexible: a broad range of data mining computations can 
be performed on the same perturbed data, at the cost of some accuracy loss.  
4.7.2 PPDM for knowledge hiding  
Knowledge hiding or rule hiding [200] refers to the process of modifying the original database in such 
a way that certain sensitive (confidential) rules are no longer inferable, while preserving the data and 
the non-sensitive rules as much as possible.  A  classification  rule  is  an  expression  r  :  X  →  C,  where  C  is  
a class item (e.g. Credit=yes in a data set classifying customers between those who are granted credit 
or not) and X is an itemset (set of values of attributes) containing no class item (e.g. Gender=female, 
City=Barcelona).  The  support  of  a  rule  r  :  X  →  C  is  the  number  of  records  that  contain  X  ,  whereas  the  
confidence of the rule is the proportion of records that contain C among those containing X . Rule 
hiding techniques change the data to decrease the confidence or support of sensitive rules to less than 
the minimum confidence or support threshold required for a rule to be inferred. Data perturbation, 
data reconstruction, data reduction and data blocking are some principles that have been proposed 
to implement rule hiding.  
4.8 Technologies for user privacy: private information retrieval  
User privacy has found solutions mainly in the cryptographic community, where the notion of private 
information retrieval was invented (PIR, [63]). In PIR, a user wants to retrieve an item from a database 
or search engine without the latter learning which item the user is retrieving. In the PIR literature the 
database is usually modelled as a vector. The user wishes to retrieve the value of the i-th component 
of the vector while keeping the index i hidden from the database. Thus, it is assumed that the user 
knows the physical address of the sought item, which might be too strong an assumption in many 
practical situations. Keyword PIR [64] is a more flexible form of PIR: the user can submit a query con-
sisting of a keyword and no modification in the structure of the database is needed.  
The PIR protocols in the above cryptographic sense have two fundamental shortcomings which hinder 
their practical deployment:  
• The database is assumed to contain n items and PIR protocols attempt to guarantee maximum 
privacy, that is, maximum server uncertainty on the index i of the record retrieved by the user. 
Thus, the computational complexity of such PIR protocols is O(n). Intuitively, all records in the 
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database  must  be  “touched”;  otherwise,  the  server  would  be  able  to  rule  out  some  of  the  
records when trying to discover i. For large databases, O(n) computational cost is unafforda-
ble.  
• It is assumed that the database server co-operates in the PIR protocol. However, it is the user 
who is interested in her own privacy, whereas the motivation for the database server is dubi-
ous. Actually, PIR is likely to be unattractive to most companies running queryable databases, 
as it limits their profiling ability. This probably explains why no real instances of PIR-enabled 
databases can be mentioned.  
If one wishes to run PIR against a search engine, there is another shortcoming beyond the lack of 
server co-operation: the database cannot be modelled as a vector in which the user can be assumed 
to know the physical location of the keyword sought. Even keyword PIR does not really fit, as it still 
assumes a mapping between individual keywords and physical addresses (in fact, each keyword is 
used as an alias of a physical address). A search engine allowing only searches of individual keywords 
stored in this way would be much more limited than real engines like Google and Yahoo. In view of 
the above, several relaxations of PIR have been proposed. These fall into two categories:  
• Standalone relaxations. In [88], a system named Goopir is proposed in which a user masks her 
target query by ORing its keywords with k−1 fake keyword sets of similar frequency and then 
submits the resulting masked query to a search engine or database (which does not need to 
be aware of Goopir, let alone co-operate with it). Then Goopir locally extracts the subset of 
query results relevant to the target query. Goopir does not provide strict PIR, because the 
database knows that the target query is one of the k OR-ed keyword sets in the masked query. 
TrackMeNot [121] is another practical system based on a different principle: rather than sub-
mitting a single masked query for each actual query like Goopir, a browser extension installed 
on  the  user’s  computer  hides  the  user’s  actual  queries  in  a  cloud  of  automatic  “ghost”  queries  
submitted to popular search engines at different time intervals. Again, this is not strict PIR, 
because the target query is one of the submitted ones.  
• Multi-party relaxations. The previous standalone approaches rely on fake queries and this can 
be viewed as a weakness: it is not easy to generate fake queries that look real and, besides, 
overloading the search engines/databases with fake queries clearly degrades performance. 
Multi-party relaxations avoid fake queries by allowing one user to use the help of other enti-
ties either for anonymous routing or for cross-submission:  
– An onion-routing system like Tor42 is not intended to offer query profile privacy be-
cause it only provides anonymity at the transport level; however, if complemented 
with the Torbutton component, Tor can offer application-level security (e.g. by block-
ing cookies) and it can be used for anonymous query submission. Similarly, JonDo-
nym 43  can provide application-level security with the recommended modified 
browser and add-ons. 
– In proxy-based approaches, the user sends her query to a proxy, who centralises and 
submits queries from several users to the database/search engine. Examples of prox-
ies are DuckDuckGo44, Ixquick45, Startpage46, Yippy47, etc. While using the proxy pre-
vents the database/search engine from profiling the user, the proxy itself can profile 
the user and this is a weakness.  
                                                          
42 The Tor Project, 2014. http://www.torproject.org/. 
43 JonDonym, 2014. https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/. 
44 DuckDuckGo, 2014. http://duckduckgo.com/. 
45 ixquick, 2014. http://www.ixquick.com/. 
46 Startpage, 2014. http://startpage.com/. 
47 yippy, 2014. http://yippy.com/. 
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– Another principle is peer-to-peer: a user can submit queries originated by peers and 
conversely.  In  this  way,  peers  use  each  other’s  queries  as  noise.  The  advantage  here  
is that this noise consists of real queries by other peers, rather than fake queries as in 
standalone systems. The game-theoretic analysis in [86] shows that cross-submission 
among peers is a rational behaviour. Proposals exploiting this approach include 
Crowds [165] and more recently [85, 51, 201].  
PIR techniques based on single or multiple servers are well understood scientifically, and library code 
with robust implementations is available (such as percy++48). Scalability issues however limit is ap-
plicability to databases of a few million records. Including those libraries into working products would 
involve R&D investments but should be considered an option when the number of records to be 
served make this technique theoretically possible. 
4.9 Storage privacy  
Storage privacy refers to the ability to store data without anyone being able to read (let alone manip-
ulate) them, except the party having stored the data (called here the data owner) and whoever the 
data owner authorises. A major challenge to implement private storage is to prevent non-authorised 
parties from accessing the stored data. If the data owner stores data locally, then physical access con-
trol might help, but it is not sufficient if the computer equipment is connected to a network: a hacker 
might succeed in remotely accessing the stored data. If the data owner stores data in the cloud, then 
physical access control is not even feasible. Hence, technology-oriented countermeasures are needed, 
which we next review.  
4.9.1 Operating system controls  
User authentication and access control lists managed by the operating system are the most common 
way to guarantee some level of storage privacy. However, if an attacker gains physical access to the 
computer or is able to bypass the operating system controls, he can access the data.  
4.9.2 Local encrypted storage  
Locally storing the data in encrypted form is a straightforward option. One can use full disk encryption 
(FDE) or file system-level encryption (FSE).  
In FDE, the entire content of the disk is encrypted, including the programs that encrypt bootable op-
erating system partitions. Encryption can be done using disk encryption software or hardware.  
In contrast, FSE encrypts the contents of files, but not the file system metadata, such as directory 
structure, file names, sizes or modification timestamps. FSE offer insufficient protection in case the 
metadata themselves need to be kept confidential.  
A desirable property in encrypted storage is forward secrecy. This means that if a long-term key is 
discovered by an adversary, the keys derived from that long-term key to encrypt the data must not be 
compromised. Using a non-deterministic algorithm to derive data-encrypting keys from long-term 
keys is one way to achieve forward secrecy.  
Examples of FSE systems include:  
• FileVault, used in Mac computers; encryption and decryption are performed on the fly, in a 
way transparent to the user.  
                                                          
48 http://percy.sourceforge.net/ 
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• TrueCrypt is a source-available free ware utility (discontinued in May 2014) that was used for 
on-the-fly encryption. It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, encrypt a partition or 
the entire storage device.  
• BitLocker is an FDE utility included with some versions of Windows. By default it uses the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard in cipher-block chaining model. If a Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) is available, it can be used by BitLocker to hold the disk encryption key and perform 
encryption/decryption. With a TPM, FDE is transparent to the user, who can power up and log 
into Windows as if there was no FDE.  
• LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup, [102]) is a disk encryption specification created for Linux. The 
reference implementation for LUKS operates on Linux using dm-crypt as the disk encryption 
software.  
4.9.3 Format-preserving encryption 
Format-preserving encryption encrypts a plaintext of some specified format into a ciphertext of iden-
tical format. Examples include encrypting a valid credit card number into a valid credit card number, 
encrypting an English word into an English word, etc. 
One motivation for FPE is to integrate encryption into existing applications, with well-defined data 
models that establish the formats for the values of the various attributes in databases. 
Conceptually, FPE can be viewed as a random permutation of the plaintext domain, because the ci-
phertext domain is exactly the plaintext domain. 
However, for large domains, it is infeasible to pre-generate and remember a truly random permuta-
tion. Hence, the problem of FPE is to generate a pseudorandom permutation from a secret key, in 
such a way that the computation time for a single value is small. 
Although the security of FPE was first formalized in [31], FPE constructions and algorithms were pre-
existing, like [34,147]. 
4.9.4 Steganographic storage  
Steganographic file systems [11] allow storing private information while hiding the very existence of 
such information. This mechanism gives the user a very high level of privacy: the user data are ste-
ganographically embedded in cover data.  
A steganographic file system delivers a file to a user who knows its name and password; but an at-
tacker who does not possess this information and cannot guess it, can gain no information about 
whether the file is present, even given complete access to all hardware and software. Hence, ste-
ganographic storage is especially attractive in a cloud setting, in which the hardware and the software 
are not under the  user’s  control.  Of  course,  in  a  cloud  setting,  the  information  embedding  and  recov-­‐
ery should be carried out by the user locally.  
The downsides of steganographic storage are space inefficiency (a lot of cover data are needed to 
embed the actual user data in them), and possible data loss due to data collision or loss of the embed-
ding key.  
TrueCrypt supports steganographic storage by allowing hidden volumes: two or more passwords open 
different volumes in the same file, but only one of the volumes contains actual secret data.  
4.9.5 Secure remote storage  
Encrypted and steganographic storage can also be used to obtain private storage in remote settings, 
like cloud storage. In fact, steganographic storage is especially attractive in a cloud setting, in which 
the  hardware  and  the  software  are  not  under  the  user’s  control.   
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In this case, however, the encryption/embedding and decrypt/recovery operations must be carried 
out locally, because the keys used in them must remain in the power of the user if any storage privacy 
is to be achieved. 
Outsourced  bulk  data  storage  on  remote  “clouds”  is  practical  and  relatively  safe,  as  long  as  only  the  
data owner, not the cloud service holds the decryption keys. Such storage may be distributed for 
added robustness to failures. Such systems are available, as in the case of Tahoe-LAFS, which is com-
mercially supported free software.49  
A shortcoming of encrypted cloud storage compared with local encrypted storage is the leakage of 
access patterns to data: the cloud provider or a third partly may observer which blocks are accesses, 
modified and when. The pattern of activity may in itself leak private information. Techniques such as 
oblivious transfer hide such meta-data securely, but are not yet either scalable to large stores or flex-
ible enough for general purpose storage. Approaches that attempt to obscure the pattern of accesses 
using naïve dummy queries have been repeatedly shown to be a weak privacy measure [190]. 
See Chapter 5 of [180] for more details on securing cloud storage.  
4.9.6  Search on encrypted data  
While storing encrypted data locally or remotely in cloud servers is a good way to achieve private 
storage, it implies sacrificing functionality to security and privacy. For example, if the user wishes to 
retrieve only documents containing certain keywords, one may be forced to decrypt all encrypted 
documents and search for the target keyword in the cleartext files. In a cloud setting, one must add 
the download time to the decryption time, so the task may be really cumbersome.  
Being able to search on encrypted data is very attractive, especially in cloud systems, as the remote 
user can delegate the search to the cloud system, which normally has more computing power and 
holds the encrypted data locally.  
In [181], the problem of searching on encrypted data was stated as follows. Alice has a set of docu-
ments and stores them on an untrusted server Bob. Because Bob is untrusted, Alice wishes to encrypt 
her documents and only store the ciphertext on Bob. Each document can be divided up into  ‘words’.  
Each  ‘word’  may  be  any  token;  it  may  be  a  64-bit block, a natural language word, a sentence, or some 
other atomic entity, depending on the application domain of interest. Assume Alice wants to retrieve 
only the documents containing the word W. A scheme is needed so that after performing certain com-
putations over the ciphertext, Bob can determine with some probability whether each document con-
tains the word W without learning anything else.  
In [181], some practical schemes allowing this were described. After that, such schemes have come to 
be collectively known under the name searchable encryption, on which substantial literature exists. 
Nowadays, there are two types of searchable encryption.  
• Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) encrypts the database using a symmetric encryption 
algorithm. SSE has made much progress in recent years. For example [70] reports encrypted 
search on databases with over 13 million documents. Also, in [129], the first searchable sym-
metric encryption scheme was presented that satisfies the following important properties: 
sublinear search time, security against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks, compact indexes 
and the ability to add and delete files efficiently. More references on SSE can be found in 
[180].  
• Public-key Searchable Encryption (PEKS) encrypts the database using a public-key encryption 
scheme. With PEKS, anyone (not just the data owner who encrypted the data) can search a 
                                                          
49 https://leastauthority.com 
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certain keyword in the encrypted data. While this flexibility may be an advantage for some 
applications, it can also constitute a weakness. Details on PEKS can be found in [3].  
4.10 Privacy-preserving computations  
4.10.1 Homomorphic encryption  
Privacy homomorphisms (PH) were introduced in [167] as encryption transformations mapping a set 
of operations on cleartext to another set of operations on ciphertext. If addition is one of the cipher-
text operations, then it was shown that a PH is insecure against a chosen-cleartext attack. Thus, a PH 
allowing full arithmetic on encrypted data is at best secure against known-cleartext attacks.  
In fact, all examples of PHs in [167] were broken by ciphertext-only attacks or, at most, known-
cleartext attacks [43]. Several homomorphic cryptosystems were also proposed that allow only one 
operation to be carried out on encrypted data (equivalent to either addition or multiplication on clear 
data). Such cryptosystems are called partially homomorphic and they include RSA [168], ElGamal 
[103], the well-known semantically secure Paillier cryptosystem [153] and several others.  
In [83, 84], PHs allowing both addition and multiplication to be performed on encrypted data were 
presented; the PHs in those two papers could withstand ciphertext-only attacks, but it turned out they 
could be broken by a known-cleartext attack.  
The breakthrough in homomorphic encryption came with the invention of Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (FHE) by Gentry [106]. FHE is an encryption scheme that allows any arithmetic circuit to be applied 
to ciphertexts and obtain an output ciphertext that encrypts the output that would be obtained if the 
circuit was directly applied to cleartexts. Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) are schemes that 
can evaluate only circuits of bounded multiplicative depth.  
The state of the art of SHE schemes is that there are constructions that efficiently evaluate relatively 
simple circuits. The most efficient SHE-schemes are those based on a lattice problem called Ring-LWE. 
For example, the BGV scheme [41] and the scheme based on the NTRU cryptosystem [141]. Another 
family of efficient schemes is based on integer approximate-GCD problem [196]. Some of these effi-
cient SHE constructions (e.g. [41]) support SIMD evaluation, which allows efficient processing of bulky 
data. See [180] for more references on homomorphic systems. 
Computations relaying primarily on adding encrypted data items, and performing only a limited depth 
of multiplication on secrets, can be practically executed. Example protocols for computing simple sta-
tistics for smart metering deployments have been proposed and implemented [128], or even for train-
ing and evaluating simple regression models [109]. We recommend designers to consider SHE to com-
pute simple but high-value results on private data. However, FHE or even SHE, cannot at this time be 
considered an alternative to running any program on cleartext data, due to its relatively low perfor-
mance in general. This means that the privacy of data used for general computations on remote serv-
ers or clouds is inherently vulnerable against adversaries with local or logical access to those infra-
structures. 
4.10.2 Secure multi-party computation  
Secure multi-party computation is also known as secure computation or multiparty computation 
(MPC). MPC methods enable several parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs, while at 
the same time keeping these inputs private. In the most general case, the joint computation may have 
one private output for each party.  
MPC was first introduced by Andrew C. Yao [208] with  the  motivation  of  the  “millionaire  problem”:  
two millionaires wish to compute which one is richer, but without revealing to each other how much 
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money they have. MPC has been more general described in [63a,107]. Applications of MPC include 
privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM, e.g. [140]) and private information retrieval (PIR), mentioned 
in Section 4.7 above. E-voting systems (e.g. SCYTL [166],  Prêt  à  Voter  [175]) can also be regarded as a 
special case of MPC, in which the set of voters wish to compute the tally in such a way that the ballot 
of each voter stays private. It must be said, however, that one tends to use solutions for those appli-
cations that are less computationally involved than MPC.  
Security in MPC can be passive or active. Passive security means that parties are honest-but-curious, 
that is, they follow the protocol but may try to learn the inputs of other parties. Active security as-
sumes that the privacy of inputs (and maybe outputs) is preserved even if parties arbitrarily deviate 
from the protocol.  
The following two are important primitives to build MPC protocols:  
• Oblivious transfer. An oblivious transfer is a protocol in which a sender transfers one of po-
tentially many pieces of information to a receiver, but remains oblivious as to what piece if 
any has been transferred. In [132] it was shown that oblivious transfer is complete for MPC: 
that is, given an implementation of oblivious transfer, it is possible to securely evaluate any 
polynomial-time computable function without any additional primitive.  
• Secret sharing and verifiable secret sharing. Secret sharing [172, 35] refers to methods for 
distributing a secret amongst a group of participants, each of whom is allocated a share of the 
secret. The secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient number, of possibly different 
types, of shares are combined together; the sets of shares which allow reconstructing the 
secret are collectively called an access structure. A set of shares that is not in the access struc-
ture is of no use. Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) schemes allow participants to be certain that 
no other players are lying about the contents of their shares, up to a reasonable probability 
of error. In [160] a VSS protocol was presented and it was shown that it could be used to 
implement any MPC protocol if a majority of the participants are honest. Furthermore the 
MPC thus achieved are information-theoretically secure: the privacy of the inputs is guaran-
teed without making any computational assumptions.  
See [180] for additional references on MPC schemes and in particular for commercial systems imple-
menting passively secure MPC. 
Privacy-friendly computations based on MPC are practical for certain categories of simple but poten-
tially high value scenarios. Secret sharing based MPC has been used to compute the outcome of beet 
auctions in Denmark50 – a rather complex protocol. Secret sharing based MPC is also being trialled for 
computing privately aggregates of smart meter consumption in the Netherlands[74], and enables a 
product for protecting passwords51. There is good tool support for expressing and compiling compu-
tations into MPC, such as the free fairplay compiler [147], the commercial sharemind system52. As 
such for the use and deployment of solutions based on MPC, when applicable, should be encouraged. 
4.11 Transparency-enhancing techniques  
Several types of tools or functionalities have been proposed to enhance transparency and to place 
users in a better position to understand what data about them are collected and how they are used. 
Transparency-enhancing technologies (or: transparency tools) may comprise various properties that 
promote privacy and data protection [115, 118, 52]: (1) provision of information about the intended 
                                                          
50 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/PEC2011/presentations2011/toft.pdf 
51 http://www.dyadicsec.com/technology/ 
52 https://sharemind.cyber.ee/ 
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or actual privacy-relevant data processing and related risks, (2) overview of what privacy-relevant data 
the user has disclosed to which entity under which policies, (3) support of the user in  “counter  profil-­‐
ing”  capabilities for extrapolating the analysis of privacy-relevant data, in particular with respect to 
group profiling. An additional functionality is the combination with online access to personal data and 
possibilities to exercise data subject rights such as withdrawing consent or requesting rectification, 
blocking and erasure of personal data (cf. Section 4.12).  
Transparency-enhancing techniques cannot be realised by technological tools alone, but need to be 
intertwined with processes that provide the necessary information. Also, support of transparency for 
users has to be ensured no matter if the user employs specific technological solutions or not. In the 
following, the necessary processes for achieving transparency and complying with all of the notifica-
tion obligations (of users or other data subjects as well as supervisory authorities, cf. Section 3.2) will 
not be further discussed, but they have to be considered in each specific case of privacy by design.  
Since  transparency  in  this  context  aims  at  individuals’  understanding  of  data  processing  and  related  
risks to provide a fair basis for informational self-determination, specific attention has been paid to 
usability [99] as well as accessibility and inclusion when designing transparency mechanisms and de-
termining the ways to communicate information. Not all users are interested in all details of data 
processing, others would not be satisfied if they could only get high-level information. Here a common 
approach, also supported by the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party [20], is to make available the 
information in multiple levels of detail, as needed by the individual.  
Transparency-enhancing technologies can be classified into different categories depending on the un-
derlying trust model:  
• At one end of the spectrum, certain companies (such as Google) provide a privacy dashboard 
showing, for example, the type of personal data that they collect, how they are used, to what 
parties they are made visible53, etc. Such dashboards have to be carefully designed to ensure 
that they do not mislead users and actually do not worsen rather than improve the situation 
[138]. Since the information is provided in a declarative mode, the subject has to trust the 
service provider for presenting the situation in a fair and comprehensive way.  
• Other tools extract by themselves the privacy information rather than depending on the dec-
larations of the service providers. For example, Lightbeam54 (formerly Collusion) is a Firefox 
browser add-on that analyses the events occurring when a user visits a website and continu-
ously updates a graph showing the tracking sites and their interactions. In the same spirit, 
tools such as TaintDroid [94] or Mobilitics [5] have been developed to detect information 
flows on smart phones (especially through third-party applications) and to report them to the 
users [95, 5]. A more comprehensive approach has been realised in the identity management 
projects PRIME and PrimeLife, the so-called Data Track [100, 54, 12], and further developed 
in the project A4Cloud [98]. This user-side function keeps track of the disclosure of personal 
data and logs which attributes (including pseudonyms) have been revealed to which entity 
under which conditions. This makes it easier for users to employ the same pseudonyms (or, if 
desired, not the same, of course) as in previous transactions with the same communication 
partner. The Data Track also provides an overview for later checks by the user (see also Section 
4.12).  
                                                          
53 In some cases, such as the Google dashboard, users can also manage their privacy settings and access (part 
of) their data through the dashboard.  
54 https://www.mozilla.org/fr/lightbeam/ 
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• Another type of support to website users is offered by sites such as ToS;DR55 (Terms of Service; 
Didn’t  Read)  and  TOSBack56. These sites rely on the effort of communities of peers (or experts) 
to evaluate privacy policies and track their evolution. This approach can be seen as a way to 
alleviate the inherent imbalance of powers between subjects and data controllers through a 
collaboration between subjects.  
• Furthermore seals and logos might help to reduce the user burden, eg, the RFID logo57 
Several languages are also available to make it easier for service providers and users to express their 
privacy policies and privacy requirements (sometimes called  “privacy  preferences”)  respectively.  Dec-­‐
larations in these languages can be automatically translated into a machine-readable format. The pri-
vacy policy of a site can then be matched with the privacy requirements of the user and appropriate 
decisions taken (or information provided to the user) depending on the result of the matching.  
The first and most well-known framework providing this kind of facilities are P3P58 and Privacy Bird59. 
P3P allows website managers to declare their privacy policies and Privacy Bird displays different icons 
and acoustic alerts to inform the user and let her take the decision to visit the site, to have a closer 
look at its privacy policy, or to avoid it. Criticism has been raised against P3P through [164], both on 
the technical side and on the legal side60. Firstly, the categories of data that can be used to specify 
policies may be too coarse in many situations and, as a result, users are driven into excessive data 
disclosure. Secondly, a limitation of P3P is a lack of clarity which leaves the way open to divergent 
interpretations of privacy policies.  
A possible way to address this issue is to endow the privacy policy language with a mathematical se-
mantics. For example, CI [26] (Contextual Integrity) is a logical framework for expressing and reasoning 
about norms of transmission of personal information. CI makes it possible, for example, to express the 
fact that an agent acts in a given role and context. S4P [29] is an abstract61, generic language based on 
notions of declaration and permission. A distinctive feature of S4P is the support of credential-based 
delegation of authority (allowing for example a user to delegate authority to perform certain actions 
to a certification authority). SIMPL [139, 144] is a more concrete language allowing users to express 
their  policies  using  sentences  such  as  “I  consent  to  disclose  my  identity  to  colleagues  when  I  meet  
them  in  the  premises  of  my  company”.  In  contrast  with  P3P,  this  kind  of  sentence  is  associated with a 
formal semantics in a mathematical framework, which makes it possible to prove properties about 
the policies or to show that a given implementation is consistent with the semantics62. It should be 
stressed however that, even though they may have an impact in the design of future languages, these 
proposals are not currently supported by widely usable tools.  
The channels to inform individuals are not limited to natural language and machine-readable items: 
privacy icons as well as other visual support are being proposed [100, 115, 69, 12], and even the acous-
tic signals of the Privacy Bird depending on the matching results between a given privacy policy and 
the own privacy requirements constitute a valuable way to help users’  comprehension.  It  is  not a trivial 
task to define and design appropriate icons or other means that are easily understandable by many 
                                                          
55 http://tosdr.org/ 
56 https://tosback.org/ 
57 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-889_en.htm 
58 Platform for Privacy Preferences, http://www.w3.org/P3P/ [69]  
59 http://www.privacybird.org/ 
60 The question of the validity of consent conveyed through this kind of tool is not straightforward [140, 157].  
61 S4P is abstract in the sense that, in order to keep the language simple, the choice is made to avoid specifying 
the semantics of service behaviours, leaving scope for the integration of specific or application dependent ac-
tions  such  as,  for  example,  “informing  third  parties”  or  “deleting  data”. 
62 In other words, that the system behaves as expected by the user. 
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users in a globalised world. When it comes to expressing specific privacy-enhancing functionality, e.g. 
concerning data minimising effects, even more challenges occur because the concepts are sometimes 
hard to grasp and may be counter-intuitive. Both privacy policy languages and icons or other audio-
visual means could tremendously profit from standardisation.  
4.12 Intervenability-enhancing techniques  
“Intervenability”,  as  introduced  in  the  explanation on privacy protection goals in Section 3.1, means 
the possibility to intervene and encompasses control by the user, but also control by responsible en-
tities over contractors performing data processing on their behalf. Typical examples from the individ-
ual’s  perspective are giving, denying or withdrawing consent; exercising the rights to access (although 
this can also be regarded as a transparency functionality), to rectification, to blocking and to erasure 
of personal data; entering and terminating a contract; installing, de-installing, activating and de-acti-
vating a technical component; sending requests or filing complaints concerning privacy-related issues; 
involving data protection authorities or bringing an action at law.  
It can be easily seen that intervenability techniques can often not be implemented solely on a technical 
level; instead, many processes of our democratic society and in particular of the juridical systems con-
tribute to effective intervenability. Still, there are a few possibilities for technological support of the 
processes that have to be realised by the data processing entities, e.g. for enabling users to exercise 
their rights (cf. Section 2.2).  
The Data Track, as already mentioned in Section 4.11, provides users online functionality for accessing 
their personal data (insofar this was offered by the communication partners) and helps them with 
requests concerning rectification and erasure [100, 115].  
For privacy by design, it is essential to assist users and support their intervention possibilities. This 
begins already when users can easily conclude a contract and become a customer, but can hardly 
dissolve the contract and enforce the erasure of personal data that is not necessary anymore. For 
smart homes, intervenability could mean to be able to temporarily or permanently de-activate the 
sensors for those whose privacy-relevant data might be processed. This example shows the relation 
to social norms, e.g. whether and how guests of a smart home should also be able to express under 
which conditions they agree that their data is processed in the smart home or not. 
5 Conclusions & Recommendations  
This report is a first step towards establishing a set of guidelines for designing privacy-friendly and 
legally compliant products and services. This ambitious goal required us to bridge several disciplines, 
in particular policy and law making as well as engineering, implementation and provision of services 
that process data.  
While working on the report, the authors discovered a wide set of divergent or even incompatible 
notions and definitions in the relevant disciplines, e.g. sometimes privacy is used in the narrow inter-
pretation of data confidentiality, while others see a wider interpretation, or in some fields, the terms 
anonymity and pseudonymity are used interchangeably. Given the development of each field, we be-
lieve that a unification of these notions would be an impossible task; especially since the individually 
established terminology has to serve a variety of purposes in the respective fields. Thus we came to 
the conclusion that efforts need to be made to bridge the different communities, and to create a 
shared understanding of problems that may lead to a future shared vocabulary.  
We also note that the solutions, techniques and building blocks presented in this report are of differing 
maturity levels. Moreover, not all privacy issues can be tackled by a method or technology alone or at 
all. We will briefly discuss limits of privacy by design (cf. Section 5.1). We have to bear in mind that 
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some issues are still open, i.e. there is no technology or method to effectively cope with them. Lastly, 
we will provide a set of recommendations that exhort communities and decision making bodies to 
improve the situation (cf. Section 5.2).  
5.1 Limits of privacy by design  
Privacy by design is a technical approach to a social problem [112]. Obviously technology cannot help 
with all related aspects. Especially in the field of privacy, which touches various basic rights topics, 
such as freedom of expression and press, or protection from discrimination, issues have to be tackled 
in a grander scheme by society as a whole. There is a caveat to this: a significant part of the low-level 
privacy invasion is the direct result of the internal functioning of technical systems. Thus, while the 
incentives and will to invade privacy may be social problems, the actual ability to do so is a technical 
problem in many instances. Thus, dealing with it at the technology level is necessary. 
Apart from this general discussion, there are limitations in the details. In this section we briefly discuss 
some of the predominant limitations. It needs to be stressed that this list is not exhaustive. Further-
more, most of the issues discussed here are not inherent limitations and obstacles to the application 
of privacy by design, but limitations that all parties should be aware of and calling for more research 
and actions from all stakeholders.  
Fragility of privacy properties 
Many privacy properties are fragile with respect to composition, i.e., if a system that fulfils a certain 
property is embedded within or connected to another system, it is hard to assess if that privacy prop-
erty is preserved. Similarly, even if two systems that fulfil a given property are combined, the resulting 
composed systems might not fulfil the property that was individually provided by both systems. This 
non-composability can easily be proven; however, the proof is by counter-example: For instance, given 
a message that is considered privacy-relevant data, i.e. it should not be disclosed, and two systems, 
where system 1 encrypts the message and sends the cypher text over a public channel and system 2 
encrypts the message and sends the key over a public channel. Both systems alone do preserve the 
confidentiality of the message; however, if combined in a way that the same key is used for the same 
message in both systems, the confidentiality of the message cannot be guaranteed. By the nature of 
such a proof by counter-example, it does not provide properties for composition. Here more work on 
privacy-preserving composition is needed. Hence in practice, it is not sufficient to argue components 
of a privacy system are compliant, but one must also evaluate how they have been put together to 
ensure the resulting system is also compliant. 
Privacy metrics and utility limitations 
In general a privacy metric allows comparing two systems with the same or similar functionality with 
respect to a set of privacy properties. However, at the moment of writing, the authors are not aware 
of a general and intuitive metric; known metrics are mostly used in the context of attacks on known 
systems (indicating how hard a given attack on a certain system is). From an information-theoretic 
point of view these metrics could be generalised. Since privacy has a social component, i.e., in different 
societies the value of a certain data item differs, the information-theoretic point of view would fall 
too short for data minimisation. Hence the notion of what usage of data is minimal differs. This lack 
of metric limits the practicality of the data minimisation principle, since it is not clear how to construct 
the objective function that is to be minimised. For instance, systems claiming data minimisation prop-
erties may indeed abstain from a few data attributes, but at the same time be far from an optimal 
solution. It may even be the case that those systems with some first steps towards data minimisation 
would need an entire re-design for optimising this privacy property because there would not be a 
transition possibility in the chosen system construction towards further data minimisation. Moreover, 
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the lack of a universal privacy metric makes risk assessment harder; it is hard to assign probability and 
economic harm to a certain privacy breach.  
Moreover, deploying privacy by design methods might limit the utility of the resulting system. Hence 
the designer needs to find a trade-off between privacy and utility w.r.t. a certain metric For example, 
two approaches to construct privacy-friendly statistical databases can be observed.  
(1) Prior privacy. This corresponds to privacy by design. A privacy model (k-anonymity, differential 
privacy, etc.) and  a  parameterisation  are  used  on  the  original  data  to  obtain  “a  priori”  privacy  guaran-­‐
tees for the resulting anonymised data. The problem here is that the resulting anonymised data may 
have little analytical utility.  
(2) Posterior privacy. An anonymisation method with certain utility preservation features is used on 
the original data to make sure that the anonymised data will at least preserve certain characteristics 
from the original data (e.g. means and variances). After that, the extant privacy (e.g. disclosure risk) is 
measured. If the disclosure risk is too high, then the anonymisation method is re-run with more strin-
gent parameters (or is replaced by another method).  
It turns out that the vast majority of organisations publishing anonymised data (national statistical 
offices, etc.) use the posterior privacy approach. The prior privacy approach (privacy by design) is quite 
popular among the computer science academic community but, with the exception of k-anonymity, is 
seldom used in real data releases. Anonymisation is a key challenge for the next decade because this 
tension between privacy and utility will be at the core of the development of the big data business. 
Increased complexity 
Improving privacy might add user burden and friction to a system. Mental models and metaphors from 
the brick and mortar world might not always work in the cyberworld. Furthermore, the complexity of 
the system increases even if naive implementations are considered. Privacy properties might add even 
more complexity, often by distribution of knowledge and power. However, this makes it more difficult 
to determine responsibilities if something went wrong. In addition, it is for the user not always clear 
why privacy by design and default matters, if consent was asked. The argument by a considerable 
proportion  of  the  society   is:  “if   I  do not want to reveal a certain fact to the general public, I might 
better   tell  nobody.”  Even   though   this  argument   is  not  valid, it has prominent advocates, e.g., Eric 
Schmidt has said “If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't 
be doing it in the first place”.  
Implementation obstacles 
System manufacturers and standardisation bodies are usually not addressed by the data protection 
law. They are both rather industry and thereby market driven. However, it seems that privacy as a 
product is not a success. Due to network effects, it is even to observe that privacy-intrusive products 
are more successful than diligently developed products in line with privacy principles. But even when 
privacy by design principles are applied, this does not guarantee lawfulness; for instance, the devel-
oped systems may be in conflict with other legal obligations, e.g. demanding or retaining data that 
would not be necessary for the purpose. Furthermore, there are no or little incentives for industry to 
apply privacy by design since there are no or little penalties for developments not compliant with 
privacy by design. Moreover, there is still a lack of design methodologies and tools that are integrated 
in software development environments.  
Unclear or too narrow interpretation of privacy by design 
A further limitation of privacy by design occurs when it is very narrowly interpreted. Many decision 
makers use the terms privacy and data protection interchangeable ignoring certain aspects of privacy. 
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From this reductionist view on privacy stems also the strong focus on data minimisation. Even though 
it is true that what is not collected cannot be lost (or disclosed), for many interesting applications 
controlled disclosure of information is more important because some personal data has to be dis-
closed and the subject keeps all his legal rights on his personal data after disclosure. For example, the 
data has to be used only for the declared purpose, deleted when it is no longer necessary, the subject 
is entitled to get access to his data, etc. However, it is technologically very hard to keep control over 
information once it has been disclosed, hence the need for transparency and accountability.  
5.2 Recommendations  
In  today’s  information  and  communication  technology  landscape,  privacy  by  design  usually  does  not  
happen by itself, but it needs to be promoted. There is a deficiency in awareness and knowledge 
among system developers and service providers. Traditional and widespread engineering approaches 
simply ignore privacy and data protection features when realising the desired functionality. The situ-
ation is further aggravated by a deficit of current developer tools and frameworks, which make it easy 
to build non-compliant systems, but nearly impossible to build a compliant one. The research commu-
nity dealing with privacy and data protection is growing. However, research on privacy engineering is 
currently insufficiently interlinked with practice, i.e. many potential solutions go unnoticed by those 
who could apply or provide them, and some potential solutions are rather incompatible with the utility 
and functionality that is expected in a practical setting. Having said that, in several areas there is a 
considerable need for research on privacy and data protection issues—on the methodological-con-
ceptual as well as the operational-practical level. Further, regulatory bodies often lack expertise as 
well as resources for effective enforcement of compliance with the legal privacy and data protection 
framework, which will explicitly demand data protection by design as soon as the European General 
Data Protection Regulation comes into force.  
In the remainder of this section, we give recommendations for actions to be taken so that engineering 
privacy by design becomes reality in all sectors of development.  
Incentive and deterrence mechanisms (policy makers) 
Policy makers need to support the development of new incentive mechanisms and need to promote 
them. These need to move away  from  a  narrative  of  “balance”  between  privacy  and  security.  Both 
goals are necessary and can be achieved, and in fact in many contexts they mean the same thing. 
Furthermore the motivation to implement privacy and data protection measures needs to move from 
fear-based arguments; privacy protection needs to be seen rather as an asset than as cost factor.  
System developers and service providers need clear incentives to apply privacy by design methods 
and offer privacy-friendly and legally compliant products and services. This needs to include the es-
tablishment of audit schemes and seals taking into account privacy criteria to enable the costumer to 
make informed choices, but also to establish effective penalties for those who do not care or even 
obstruct privacy-friendly solutions. As set forth in a recent annual report by the French Council of State 
[211], for systems processing sensitive data or for which a high level of risk has been identified, data 
processors should have an obligation of periodic privacy assessments operated by independent certi-
fication bodies. Further, we recommend that when DPAs consider penalties for breaches or violations 
they take into account the degree to which organisations provided technical controls such as the im-
plementation of PETs to protect privacy and data. 
Public services must serve as a role model by increasing the demand of privacy by design solutions. 
Hence public services should be legally obliged to only use systems and services where the provider 
can convincingly demonstrate that those are privacy-friendly and compliant with privacy and data 
protection law. Privacy and data protection criteria have to become part of the regular procurement 
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procedures. Furthermore, infrastructures should implement and support privacy and data protection 
functionality as much as possible. This will create a market for privacy-friendly services, which also 
gives a choice to individuals or companies.  
Funding agencies of member states or the EU should require a successful privacy and data protection 
assessment of each project and planned or achieved results. This should begin before deciding on 
funding or subsidies. Funding may also play a role for actively promoting privacy by design where 
market forces have not been working in favour. For instance, all developed products and services have 
to compete with well-established, yet privacy-invasive business models, e.g. when services on the In-
ternet   are   offered   for   “free”   by   harvesting   personal  data   of   users.  Here  other  models   have   to   be 
sought—which may involve support by state money for products or services that become essential for 
the information society or taxing mechanisms (for example on the processing of personal data) as 
already proposed in several studies. This is in particular true for infrastructures, e.g. when setting up 
and providing communication systems that guarantee end-to-end encryption as well as anonymity on 
a basic layer to protect citizens against analysis of content and metadata by service providers or secret 
services.  
A revision of policy is necessary to eliminate loopholes. In particular, legal compliance of a product or 
service should not be possible if it is not designed under the privacy by design paradigm. Here special 
attention has to be given to data minimisation as a default, comprehensive and easily accessible in-
formation for users and support for the rights of the persons concerned. Seeking  the  user’s  consent  
should not allow for a disproportionate processing of personal data. Having said that, the burden of 
this process needs to be lowered cf. our recommendation practical support. 
Furthermore, data protection authorities should be equipped with extended mandates and funds to 
be able to actively search for data protection violations. This instrument can only be effective if suffi-
cient deterrence mechanisms are in place. However penalties are not necessarily the most deterring 
factor for all industries (and even less for states) and negative publicity can be a much more effective 
deterrent in many cases. Therefore, data protection authorities should also have the duty to make 
public all data protection and privacy breaches and their extent. 
Promoting a deeper understanding (R&D community, education, media, policy makers) 
The research community needs to further investigate in privacy engineering, especially with a mul-
tidisciplinary approach. This process should be supported by research funding agencies. The results 
of research need to be promoted by policy makers and media. Currently the research results do not 
provide answers and solutions to all questions concerning privacy engineering. Here the communities 
from various disciplines—computer science, engineering, law, economics, psychology, sociology, eth-
ics, to name only a few—should continue and even strengthen their efforts in research. Especially 
cross-disciplinary collaboration is necessary when looking for comprehensive, future-proof solutions 
on how to design systems and services that respect the values of our society. This should be supported 
by funding agencies as well as the individual research communities that traditionally focus on their 
own methodology and hardly encourage thinking outside the box. Cross-disciplinary work should not 
be  harmful  to  a  researcher’s  career  or  count  less  than  other  approaches when assessing the achieve-
ments of a scientist. Interdisciplinarity should be promoted in a more systematic and pro-active way, 
for example by ensuring that selection committees in calls for proposals or position offers are inter-
disciplinary. In the absence of such measures interdisciplinarity is bound to remain a pious wish.  
Better understanding should also be increased with respect to policy makers. Several initiatives have 
already been taken in Europe to improve the interactions between government bodies, parliaments, 
academics, and civil society. For example, in June 2014 the French national assembly has set up a 
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commission  on  “rights  and  freedom  in the  digital  age”63 with equal representation from members of 
parliament and experts and the Italian parliament has taken a similar initiative64. These efforts should 
be encouraged at the European level to ensure a better mutual understanding of the specific issues 
raised by information technologies, especially with respect to privacy. 
Also, the discussion on operational privacy engineering is up to now a mainly a technological discus-
sion; however, it has direct implications on the organisational structure of a service or product as well 
as on the business models and processes. Data processing entities, vendors and manufacturers of 
products and service providers should keep in mind that a holistic approach is necessary for building 
in privacy and data protection features. Hence privacy by design methodologies should and already 
do cover non-technological aspects.  
In addition, education programs for raising awareness as well as transmitting knowledge need to be 
introduced for different target groups. This comprises a hands-on approach for software developers 
and system providers, tackling of policy-related considerations for legislators and decision makers and 
practical advice for data-processing entities looking for products and services to be used for their pur-
poses. Particular attention should be paid to those concepts and modules that may seem counter-
intuitive and are not easily translated into mental models, e.g. functionality based on zero-knowledge 
proofs. It would be good if teachers and media would contribute to informing, enlightening and train-
ing people to foster understanding, practical usage of tools and a competent debate. Having said that, 
privacy researchers need to be encouraged to increase their practical knowledge, i.e., they need to 
better understand the requirements of the applications for which they provide solutions. In addition 
it is to be observed that some proposed solutions scarify the utility of the original system, hence pri-
vacy researchers need to become more knowledgeable on the application fields for which they pro-
vide privacy-friendly technologies  
While the above described focus on the practical implementation of privacy-enhancing technology is 
of outermost importance, we also stress that fundamental research is still needed. Funding agencies 
need to support basic research on unconditional privacy enhancing technologies. In the past it was 
observed that there was a tendency to support research only if it took law enforcement mechanisms 
into account from the very beginning. However, the authors believe that this inhibits scientific pro-
gress. 
Practical support (R&D community, data protection authorities) 
Providers of software development tools and the research community need to provide tools that 
enable the intuitive implementation of privacy properties. Privacy engineering should become eas-
ier. At the moment we observe a lack of engineers that are knowledgeable in the fields of security and 
privacy. While it is a noble aim to spread the word and to educate more engineers on this topic, similar 
efforts need to be invested to make the fields more accessible. The following actions are recom-
mended.  
Development tools need to have integrated functionalities that make the design and implementation 
of privacy properties intuitive. These tools should integrate freely available and maintained compo-
nents with open interfaces and APIs. They should also make it possible to consider privacy by design 
as a continuous process encompassing all stages of the life cycle of a product or system, from risk 
analysis to design, implementation, exploitation and accountability.  
Especially in public co-founded infrastructure projects, privacy supporting components, such as key 
servers, anonymising relays, should be included. PETs need infrastructure support from key servers, 
                                                          
63 http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/commissions/numerique 
64 http://www.camera.it/leg17/537?shadow_mostra=23964 
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to encryption libraries to anonymising relays. This support for operations lowers the cost of deploying 
PETs for all users and operators. 
Furthermore, best and good practice guides need to be published and kept up-to-date involving the 
participation of the data protection authorities. These guides need to come with recommendations of 
best available techniques and state of the art reviews. A focus should be put on the question of the 
appropriate defaults for privacy and data protection. Similar to the assessment of the security level of 
cryptographic algorithms, independent experts should contribute to a description of features, de-
pendencies and the maturity of techniques and tools. For clarity on how to implement the European 
data protection framework in general and provisions on data protection by design and by default (Art. 
23 GDPR) in particular, the data protection authorities should reach a consensus on a pan-European 
level on the requirements stemming from the legal data protection framework and publish their eval-
uation results as well as joint recommendations. A starting point would be—as recommended by 
[174]—“identifying  best  practices  in  privacy  design  and  development,  including  prohibited  practices,  
required practices, and recommended  practices”. For Internet-related aspects, the Internet Privacy 
Engineering Network (IPEN)65 founded by the European Data Protection Supervisor together with 
other data protection authorities could play a central role in this endeavour. Also open-source and 
free software modules and tools should be collected and maintained in a readily available repository 
to offer a toolbox for system developers and service providers. The maintenance of the code should 
be guaranteed by provisioning public grants to consortia consisting of experts from research, practice 
and regulatory bodies, in particular data protection authorities.  
Data protection authorities will play an important role for independently providing guidance and 
assessing modules and tools for privacy engineering. As suggested in [211], they could also play a key 
role in the promotion of privacy enhancing technologies and the implementation of the transparency 
principle (in particular with respect to the use of algorithms which can have a significant impact on 
the life of individuals).For this, they need a clear mandate as well as appropriate resources, in partic-
ular technical staff with experience in evaluating privacy and data protection criteria. IPEN together 
with other data protection authorities could support this activity.  
Norms (legislators, standardisation bodies) 
Legal norms and ICT-related standards as well as social norms influence our lives to a large extent. 
Social norms predominantly play a role in the interaction of people; they evolve over time and usually 
cannot be set by order of a state or an organisation. In contrast, legislators and standardisation bodies 
expect that their output is being adhered to.  
Legislators need to promote privacy and data protection in their norms. For privacy and data protec-
tion by design becoming reality, it would be good if legislators supported the principles from the legal 
European data protection framework by harmonised law as far as relations to privacy and data pro-
tection can be identified. This comprises all kinds of legal norms that enlist personal data to be pro-
cessed—here it should be checked whether all the single data items are really necessary for the pur-
poses—as well as norms containing retention periods. Obviously national and European norms on 
cybersecurity or on personal identification have a relation, but even tax law or procurement law are 
affected and should be adjusted as much as possible. It would not be sufficient to refer to general data 
protection  rules  or  to  shallowly  mention  “privacy  by  design”  if  this  is  not  rooted  into  the  design  of  the  
respective law. Even if it is not possible to create and maintain an apparatus of consistent legal norms, 
                                                          
65 https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/IPEN  
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improvements are needed so that solutions that advance the state of the art of privacy and data pro-
tection are not—inadvertently or deliberately—excluded because they manage with less personal 
data than the legacy systems or need some initial investment.  
Standardisation bodies need to include privacy considerations in the standardisation process. A sim-
ilar situation occurs with ICT-related standards: consistency is hard to achieve, and in particular privacy 
and data protection requirements are often seen as additional demands from local law that will not 
be part of internationally agreed standards. It would be helpful for promoting privacy and data pro-
tection by design if those standards that come into effect for Europe explicitly embrace privacy and 
data protection instead ignoring it or—what is even worse—producing standards that may obstruct 
better privacy. So standardisation bodies and policy makers should integrate privacy by design in their 
ICT-related standards and policies. For this process it might be necessary to re-evaluate the ad-
vantages and disadvantages to keep policy and legislation technology neutral.  
Standardisation bodies need to provide standards for privacy features that ensure interoperability. 
For several privacy features standardisation would be helpful. For instance, interfaces between mod-
ules could be standardised to make sure that solutions with built-in privacy properties are not ex-
cluded. This would also promote the possibility of integrating privacy solutions. In the field of trans-
parency, standardised policy languages that express descriptions of data processing and safeguards 
as well as notifications of risks or how to exercise user rights would raise awareness and comprehen-
sion of individuals to another level. In particular, standardised ways for communication of privacy 
properties to the user (in a way interpreted by human beings, e.g. via privacy icons)66 as well as to the 
user’s  device  (in  a  machine-readable way) would support transparency and—if designed to support 
the  individual’s  choices  and  interventions—also user control and self-determination. Standardisation 
in this area would pave the way for users to compare different products and services with respect to 
their privacy guarantees, and it would also make compliance checks easier for data protection author-
ities. In addition, it could favour the development of collaborative platforms in which users can take 
part in the elaboration of the privacy policies [211] (rather than  being  trapped  into  a  “take  it  or  leave 
it”  situation).  Standardisation on a European level would have to be in line with the legal European 
data protection framework, and it could contribute to a world-wide understanding—or even a global 
consensus—on privacy and data protection.  
 
  
                                                          
66 One first example of successful standardisation by the European Commission is the EU-wide logo for Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) smart chips and systems (European Commission: Digital privacy: EU-wide logo 
and   “data   protection   impact   assessments”   aim   to   boost   the   use   of   RFID   systems. Brussels, 30 July 2014. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-889_en.htm). In addition to the standardised signet, a privacy and 
data protection impact assessment process has been defined that will be reviewed by national data protection 
authorities prior to the use of the RFID chips. 
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Annex A:  The policy context  
Recently  the  EU  published  policy  documents  that  promote  ‘by  design’  and  ‘by  default’  principles  for  
security, privacy, and data protection after having expressed the demand for promoting privacy-en-
hancing technologies already in 2007 [67]. Below we exemplarily list some of these policy documents, 
relevant for the EU perspective, providing the context and the expectations for these measures. This 
section extends the brief description in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 to show the trends in the European policy 
context towards privacy by design.  
A.1 Strategic policy documents related to ICT and cyberspace  
Digital Agenda for Europe. The Digital Agenda for Europe67, one of the European Commission (EC) 
initiatives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, identifies policies and actions to maximise the benefits of In-
formation and Communication Technologies. Actions are proposed as part of the modernisation of 
the European personal data  protection  regulatory  framework  “in  order  to  make  it  more  coherent  and  
legally  certain”.  For  example,  action  #4  is  specifically  dedicated  to  the  “review  of  the  European  data  
protection  regulatory  framework  with  a  view  to  enhancing  individuals’  confidence and strengthening 
their  rights”.  In  the  Digital  Agenda,  it  is  acknowledged  that  “The  right  to  privacy  and  to  the  protection  
of personal data are fundamental rights in the EU which must be—also online—effectively enforced 
using the widest range of means: from  the  wide  application  of  the  principle  of  ‘Privacy  by  Design’  [...] 
in  the  relevant  ICT  technologies,  to  dissuasive  sanctions  wherever  necessary”.   
The Cybersecurity strategy of the European Union. As a step to implement the Digital Agenda, the 
European Commission, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
have published a cybersecurity strategy for the European Union68 in February 2013. The cybersecurity 
strategy  “An  Open,  Safe  and  Secure  Cyberspace”69 provides a list of priorities and actions aimed at 
enhancing cyber resilience of information systems, reducing cybercrime and strengthening EU inter-
national cybersecurity policy and cyber defence, while promoting values of freedom and democracy 
and ensuring the safe growth of digital economy. As a part of this strategy, relevant stakeholders are 
invited   to  “[s]timulate the development and adoption of industry-led security standards, technical 
norms and security-by-design and privacy-by-design principles by ICT product manufacturers and ser-
vice providers, including cloud providers; new generations of software and hardware should be 
equipped with stronger, embedded and user-friendly  security  features”.  All  these  objectives  are  part  
of the priorities and actions to promote a single market for cybersecurity products.  
A.2 Personal data protection policy documents in the EU  
Already the ePrivacy Directive70 and especially Art. 14.3 can be interpreted as call for privacy by design; 
it empowers the Commission to set forth rules how to design  terminal  equipment  in  such  “a way that 
is compatible with the right of users to protect and control the use of their personal data, in accordance 
with Directive 1999/5/EC and Council Decision 87/95/EEC of 22 December 1986 on standardisation in 
the field of information technology and communications”. 
                                                          
67 European Commission, A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010)245, 19.05.2010, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R%2801%29:EN:NOT (last accessed on 
27.05.2014). 
68 EU Cybersecurity plan to protect open internet and online freedom and opportunity, Reference: IP/13/94, 
07/02/2013 available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-94_en.htm?locale=en 
69 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace – JOIN(2013) 1 final, 
7/2/2013, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/docu-
ment.cfm?doc_id=1667 (last accessed on 27.05.2014). 
70 Directive 2002/58/EC 
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Several documents of Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party ask for and refer to privacy by design. For 
instance in the working paper 168 on the Future of Privacy [23],  it  is  required  to  “Innovate  the  frame-­‐
work  [data  protection  framework,  editors’  comment] by  introducing  additional  principles  (such  as  ‘pri-­‐
vacy  by  design’  and  ‘accountability’).”  Furthermore,  the  principle  of  privacy  by  design  is  explained and 
reasoning for this principle is provided.  
“Users  of ICT services—business, public sector and certainly individuals—are not in a position 
to take relevant security measures by themselves in order to protect their own or other per-
sons’  personal  data.  Therefore,  these  services  and  technologies  should  be  designed with pri-
vacy by default settings.  
46. It is for these reasons that the new legal framework has to include a provision translating 
the currently punctual requirements into a broader and consistent principle of privacy by de-
sign. This principle should be binding for technology designers and producers as well as for 
data controllers who have to decide on the acquisition and use of ICT. They should be obliged 
to take technological data protection into account already at the planning stage of infor-
mation-technological procedures and systems. Providers of such systems or services as well as 
controllers should demonstrate that they have taken all measures required to comply with 
these requirements.  
47. Such principle should call for the implementation of data protection in ICT (privacy by de-
sign  or   ‘PbD’)  designated  or  used   for   the  processing  of  personal  data.   It   should  convey  the  
requirement that ICT should not only maintain security but also should be designed and con-
structed in a way to avoid or minimize the amount of personal data processed. This is in line 
with recent case law in Germany.  
48. The application of such principle would emphasize the need to implement privacy enhanc-
ing  technologies  (PETs),  ‘privacy  by  default’  settings  and  the  necessary  tools to enable users to 
better protect their personal data (e.g., access controls, encryption). It should be a crucial re-
quirement for products and services provided to third parties and individual customers (e.g. 
WiFi-Routers, social networks and search engines). In turn, it would give DPAs more powers to 
enforce  the  effective  implementation  of  such  measures.”   
Practical aspects are also highlighted:  
“In  practice,  the  implementation  of  the  privacy  by  design  principle  will  require  the  evaluation  
of several, concrete aspects or objectives. In particular, when making decisions about the de-
sign of a processing system, its acquisition and the running of such a system the following 
general aspects / objectives should be respected:  
• Data Minimization: data processing systems are to be designed and selected in 
accordance with the aim of collecting, processing or using no personal data at all 
or as few personal data as possible.  
• Controllability:71  an IT system should provide the data subjects with effective 
means of control concerning their personal data. The possibilities regarding con-
sent and objection should be supported by technological means.  
• Transparency: both developers and operators of IT systems have to ensure that 
the data subjects are sufficiently informed about the means of operation of the 
systems. Electronic access / information should be enabled.  
                                                          
71 Throughout the report we used intervenability for this aspect. 
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• User Friendly Systems: privacy related functions and facilities should be user 
friendly, i.e. they should provide sufficient help and simple interfaces to be used 
also by less experienced users.  
• Data Confidentiality: it is necessary to design and secure IT systems in a way that 
only authorised entities have access to personal data.  
• Data Quality: data controllers have to support data quality by technical means. 
Relevant data should be accessible if needed for lawful purposes.  
• Use Limitation:72 IT systems which can be used for different purposes or are run in 
a multi-user environment (i.e. virtually connected systems, such as data ware-
houses, cloud computing, digital identifiers) have to guarantee that data and pro-
cesses serving different tasks or purposes can be segregated from each other in a 
secure  way.”   
The limitations of the privacy by design are also acknowledged.  
“The  privacy  by  design  principle  may  not  be  sufficient to ensure, in all cases, that the appropri-
ate technological data protection principles are properly included in ICT. There may be cases 
where  a  more  concrete  ‘hands  on  approach’  may  be  necessary.  To  facilitate  the  adoption  of  
such measures, a new legal framework should include a provision enabling the adoption of 
specific regulations for a specific technological context which require embedding the privacy 
principles  in  such  context.” 
The proposed regulation on data protection actually includes reference to data protection by design.  
The proposed regulation on data protection. In January 2012 the European Commission proposed a 
regulation on data protection [159] that will replace the existing Data Protection Directive [82]. The 
proposal for the new regulation in general associates the requirements for data protection by design 
and data protection by default with data security and contains specific provisions relevant to privacy 
by design and by default in Article 2373.  Article  23  “Data  protection  by design  and  by  default”  sets  the  
obligations arising from these new principles, as they are referred in the proposed regulation:  
“[...] Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of implementation, the controller shall, 
both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the pro-
cessing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures and procedures 
in such a way that the processing will meet the requirements of this Regulation and ensure the 
protection of the rights of the data subject. [...] The controller shall implement mechanisms for 
ensuring that, by default, only those personal data are processed which are necessary for each 
specific purpose of the processing and are especially not collected or retained beyond the min-
imum necessary for those purposes, both in terms of the amount of the data and the time of 
their storage. In particular, those mechanisms shall ensure that by default personal data are 
not made accessible to an indefinite number of  individuals.”   
                                                          
72 Throughout the report, we used purpose limitation for this aspect. 
73http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0011:FIN:EN:PDF 71 
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The European Parliament (EP) provided amendments74 in January 2013; while the vote took place in 
March 201475. The amendments voted by the European Parliament provide more explanations regard-
ing the meaning of data protection by design and data protection by default. For instance, amendment 
33 rephrases preamble (61) and clarifies: “The  principle  of  data  protection  by  design  requires data 
protection to be embedded within the entire life cycle of the technology, from the very early design 
stage, right through to its ultimate deployment, use and final disposal. This should also include the 
responsibility for the products and services used by the controller or processor. The principle of data 
protection by default requires privacy settings on services and products which should by default comply 
with  the  general  principles  of  data  protection,  such  as  data  minimisation  and  purpose  limitation.”   
Also, Article 23 is extended, and the voted version is of alignment 1 of Article 23 is  
“Having  regard  to  the state of the art, current technical knowledge, international best prac-
tices and the risks represented by the data processing, the controller and the processor, if any, 
shall, both at the time of the determination of the purposes and means for processing and at 
the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate and proportionate technical and or-
ganisational measures and procedures in such a way that the processing will meet the require-
ments of this Regulation and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject, in partic-
ular with regard to the principles laid out in Article 5. Data protection by design shall have 
particular regard to the entire lifecycle management of personal data from collection to pro-
cessing to deletion, systematically focusing on comprehensive procedural safeguards regard-
ing the accuracy, confidentiality, integrity, physical security and deletion of personal data. 
Where the controller has carried out a data protection impact assessment pursuant to Article 
33, the results shall  be  taken  into  account  when  developing  those  measures  and  procedures.” 
Furthermore, according to Article 30, the future European Data Protection Board shall be entrusted 
with the task of issuing guidelines, recommendations and best practices taking account of develop-
ments in technology and solutions for privacy by design and data protection by default.  
While in both versions there are references to principles such privacy by design and data protection 
by design, in this document we assume they refer to same principle and we are not going to create a 
separate analysis.  
A.3 Other international conventions relevant for Europe  
OECD guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. In 
1980, the OECD adopted the Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows 
of  Personal  Data  (“1980  Guidelines”)  to  address  concerns  arising  from  the  increased  use  of  personal  
data and the risk to global economies resulting from restrictions to the flow of information across 
borders [151]. The 1980 Guidelines, which contained the first internationally agreed-upon set of pri-
vacy principles, have influenced legislation and policy in OECD Member countries and beyond.  
                                                          
74 European Parliament report on the Data Protection Regulation: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meet-
docs/2009_2014/documents/libe/pr/922/922387/922387en.pdf European Parliament report on the Data Pro-
tection Directive: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/docu-
ments/libe/pr/923/923072/923072en.pdf EC  memo  “Commission  welcomes  European  Parliament  rappor-­‐
teurs’  support  for  strong  EU  data  protection  rules”,  8th  on  January  2013,  available  at:  http://ec.eu-­‐
ropa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/m13_4_en.pdf 
75 6\EP amended version of March 2014: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+ [96] 
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The OECD Guidelines have been as amended on 11 July 2013 [152]. The revised version, in its Supple-
mentary explanatory memorandum, refers to privacy by design as a practical implementation con-
cepts where “technologies,  processes,  and  practices  to  protect  privacy  are  built  into  system  architec-­‐
tures, rather than added on  later  as  an  afterthought”.  
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data. The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Pro-
cessing of Personal Data, drawn up within the Council of Europe was opened for signature by the 
member States of the Council of Europe on 28 January 1981 in Strasbourg.  
In 2012, a modernisation proposal has been adopted, and in this proposal the principle of privacy by 
design is included in Article 8bis – Additional obligations:  
“[...] design data processing operations in such a way as to prevent or at least minimise the 
risk of interference with those rights and fundamental freedoms.  
[...] Each Party shall provide that the products and services intended for the data processing 
shall take into account the implications of the right to the protection of personal data from 
the stage of their design and facilitate the compliance of the processing with the applicable 
law.”76  
A.4 Summary  
As can be seen from previous sections, several policy documents refer to privacy/data protection by 
design and by default either as principles or as practical implementation concepts.  
While these terms are not clearly defined in all these reviewed documents, they have a common focus, 
namely, to incorporate all privacy/data protection principles through all the design and use stages of 
data processing and this to be the norm by default.  
The policy context section focuses only on the EU perspective; where, as seen in Section A.2 a data 
protection reform is ongoing. Furthermore, there are more documents not mention here that influ-
ence policy and may have to be considered in system design, e.g. resolutions of the European Privacy 
and Data  Protection  Commissioners’  Conference  or  the  International  Conference  of  Data  Protection  
and Privacy Commissioners, opinions and working papers of the Art. 29 Working Party or court rulings 
(on the European level: European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Justice).  
Besides the policy documents, there are also standardisation initiatives supporting the area, e.g. from 
ISO/IEC [125].  
 
  
                                                          
76 CoE, T-PD_2012_04_rev4_E, revision of ETS No. 108, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardset-
ting/dataprotection/TPD_documents/T-PD(2012)04Rev4_E_Conve 
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